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I. INTRODUCTION
"[H]uman Rights are women's rights-and women's rights are
human rights."1 This was Hillary Rodham Clinton's message at the
1995 United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing
("Beijing Conference"). The quotation has become a catchphrase for
international non-governmental organizations ("INGOs") based in the
Global North.2 Advocacy by INGOs to protect women's interests al-
most exclusively relies on established human rights norms and binding
legal covenants. For the most part, human rights discourse is and will
likely continue to be effective in securing women s interests internation-
ally.
1. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks to the United Nations Fourth World Conference
on Women Plenary Session in Beijing, China (Sept. 5, 1995), available at http://
douglass.speech.nwu.edu/clin a64.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2002).
2. The term "Global North" is used to refer to more developed nations such as those in
the European Union, as well as the United States and Canada.
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However, despite the relative success of the "women's rights are
human rights" approach, INGO advocates must recognize the limita-
tions of exclusive reliance on human rights theory. This article
highlights, for example, the significant theoretical constraints of univers-
alism, the tendency of human rights advocates to ignore the underlying
cause of rights violations, as well as problems associated with the con-
cept of and informal hierarchy between rights. The article suggests that
there are certain circumstances in which INGOs that rely primarily on
human rights language in their advocacy efforts may wish to supplement
their analysis with explicit reference to feminist legal theory in order to
more effectively secure women's interests globally. These ideas will be
developed with ongoing reference to the recent and successful campaign
initiated by Nepali women to have abortion legalized. The campaign was
supported by the Center for Reproduction Law and Policy (CRLP) (New
York) (now the Center for Reproductive Rights),' in partnership with the
Forum for Women, Law and Development (FWLD) (Katmandu). CRLP
became involved with the domestic campaign to legalize abortion in
2001, largely to draw attention to the massive human rights violations
arising out of its continued criminalization. Abortion was legalized by
Nepal's legislature in March 2002. The Nepal example will illustrate
more concretely the way in which INGOs tend to focus on human
rights analysis when advocating for women's rights globally.
Section II discusses in detail the campaign to legalize abortion in
Nepal. Section III considers the historical basis for the women's human
rights movement. Section IV outlines the rationales for and limitations
of exclusive reliance on human rights discourse by INGOs. Section V
explores the role that explicit reliance on feminist legal theory could play
in addressing the shortcomings of the human rights approach. The pa-
per concludes by urging advocates to remain critical of their discursive
methods, even when such methods are successful and form the primary
basis for their efforts.
3. The Center for Reproductive Rights, About Us, available at htrp://
www.crlp.org/about.html#name (last visited Oct. 4, 2003). The Center for Repro-
ductive Law and Policy officially changed its name to the Center for Reproductive
Rights on Jan. 15, 2003. According to the Center, the name change was meant to
highlight "the importance of focusing on the goals we are seeking to achieve
(rights)-not just on the tools we use to attain them (laws and policies)."
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II. THE CAMPAIGN TO LEGALIZE ABORTION IN NEPAL:
AN EXAMPLE OF THE INGO Focus
ON WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS
The campaign to legalize abortion in Nepal is illustrative of some
of the major trends in global advocacy to protect women's interests by
INGOs based in the Global North. It highlights the existence and im-
portance of domestic women's groups in advocacy to protect women's
interests.4 The campaign also emphasizes the existence and strength of
grassroots women's advocacy developed in the specific context of Nepali
women's lives, and therefore not necessarily framed in identical terms to
Western human rights or Western feminism.5 It further illustrates the
fact that initial stages of advocacy to protect women's interests usually
emanate from domestic women's groups (sometimes with the financial
support of international organizations). It is often only in the final
stages of a movement that INGOs become directly involved.6
INGO involvement usually centers around bringing attention to
the human rights issues at play. INGOs often recharacterize the issue of
domestic concern in terms of international human rights norms. This
4. THE CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE LAW AND POLICY & FORUM FOR WOMEN, LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT, ABORTION IN NEPAL: WOMEN IMPRISONED, 31-32 (2002).
5. Id.
6. These characteristics are applicable to almost all of CRLP's international campaigns,
including those initiated in Chile and El Salvador. See THE CENTER FOR REPRODUC-
TIVE LAW AND POLICY & THE OPEN FORUM ON REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND
RIGHTS, WOMEN BEHIND BARS: CHILE'S ABORTION LAws: A HUMAN RIGHTS
ANALYSIS (1998) (outlining how discriminatory customs, practices and laws in Chile
have resulted in numerous violations of women's reproductive rights); THE CENTER
FOR REPRODUCTIVE LAw AND POLICY, PERSECUTED: POLITICAL PROCESS AND ABOR-
TION LEGISLATION IN EL SALVADOR: A HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS (2001) (considering
how a recent constitutional amendment protecting the right to life from conception
has impacted women's reproductive rights in El Salvador).
These insights are also applicable to campaigns by the Women's Rights Division
of Human Rights Watch. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FROM THE HOUSEHOLD TO
THE FACTORY: SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE GUATEMALAN LABOR FORCE (2002) (out-
lining the continual violation of female workers' labor rights in the context of
economic integration); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE WAR WITHIN THE WAR: SEX-
UAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIR.s IN EASTERN CONGO (2002) (outlining
violations of women's human rights in the form of sexual violence experienced during
the civil war).
[Vol. 10:275
THE USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE
usually involves reminders to the state7 and intergovernmental organiza-
tions8 of the human rights obligations at issue.
The campaign in Nepal also illustrates the persuasiveness of appeals
to international human rights law for states seeking international accep-
tance. New and/or less-powerful states may be especially eager to
comply with international treaties to affirm their commitment to the
international legal order.9 It is easier for INGOs to seek such compliance
when analysis of the issues is based on binding international covenants
related to human rights.
More narrowly, Nepal is a compelling example because, as will be
discussed in more detail below, the criminalization of abortion in Nepal
was a serious problem.' ° Given the severity and pervasiveness of the
harm suffered by Nepali women due to the criminalization of abortion,
the potential positive impact of a successful campaign to secure women's
interests is all the more clear." The eventual willingness of the govern-
ment to reform the abortion law after initial hesitancy exemplifies the
impact that advocacy by domestic women's groups and INGOs can
have on the situation of women.
A. The Criminalization ofAbortion in Nepal
Abortion was legalized in Nepal in March 2002. Until that time
the law relating to abortion was extreme. Under the Muluki Ain, 2020
(Country Code) ("Muluki Ain") abortion was characterized as homicide
and was not permitted under any circumstance: "Except while doing
something for the purpose of welfare, if a pregnancy is terminated, the
person who terminates the pregnancy, the person who makes another
7. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, to the
Government of Nepal [hereinafter Memo of CRLP to Government of Nepal] (on file
with author).
8. See, e.g., Letter from Katherine Hall Martinez, Deputy Director & Melissa Upreti,
Staff Attorney, International Program, Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, to
The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Aug. 10, 2001) [herein-
after Martinez and Upreti].
9. See Christine M. Chinkin, Book Note, 92 AM. J. INT'L. L. 589, 590 (1998) (review-
ing M.J. PETERSON, RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS: LEGAL DOCTRINE AND STATE
PRACTICE, 1815-1995 (1997)).
10. ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 14 ("For the women of Nepal, that country's
abortion prohibition is a source of profound injustice.").
11. Indeed, the legalization of abortion may have little impact on women if, despite the
prior criminal penalty, safe abortions were widely available and people were never
criminally prosecuted.
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terminate a pregnancy or the person who helps in the termination of a
pregnancy shall be guilty of an offense.,
12
On the face of the statute, it appears that abortion could be justi-
fied in limited circumstances, i.e., "for the purpose of welfare." In fact,
the term "welfare" was undefined in law and most legal authorities and
commentators held that abortion was never permissible. 3 Abortion was
not allowed even if it was necessary to save the woman's life or health, if
the pregnancy would result in fetal impairment, or was the result of rape
or incest.' 4 This made the Nepali law concerning abortion amongst the
harshest in the world. 5
Nepal was also unique in being one of only a handful of countries
that consistently prosecuted and imposed severe sanctions upon women
who had abortions." Women accused of abortion faced a penalty of up
to five years imprisonment." The severity of the punishment varied ac-
cording to the duration of the pregnancy and whether or not the
woman consented to the procedure. 8 To compound the issue, due to
inadequate fact-finding by police, women who miscarried were often
prosecuted for abortion. 9 Moreover, women who had abortions were
12. ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 12 (citing Muluki Ain 2020 [Country Code
1963], ch. 10, No. 28 (unofficial translation) [hereinafter MulukiAin]).
13. Id. at 39 ("While some law enforcement officials have interpreted narrow exceptions
into the law, most legal authorities and commentators affirm that abortion is not
permitted on any ground." (citing Interview with Butwal, Court of Appeals Justice,
in Nepal (Mar.16, 2001); Interview with Nawaparasi, District Court Judge, in Ne-
pal (Mar.15, 2001))).
14. See Prem J. Thapa et. al, A Hospital-Based Study of Abortion in Nepal, 23 STUD. IN
F~m. PLAN. 311, 312 (1992).
15. See The Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, Nations Worldwide Support a
Woman's Right to Choose Abortion, 2 (Mar. 2000), available at http://
reproductiverights.org/pub-fac atkwwsup.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2003). Only
forty-four countries in the world, representing significantly less than a quarter of the
world's population, have similarly strict laws. In contrast, fifty nations, representing
more than 40% of the world's population, permit abortion without restriction as to
reason. The remaining ninety-seven nations permit abortion in certain circumstances.
16. See THE CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH AND POPULATION Ac-
TIVITIES (CREHPA), WOMEN IN PRISON IN NEPAL FOR ABORTION: A STUDY ON
IMPLICATIONS OF RESTRICTIVE ABORTION LAW ON WOMEN'S SOCIAL STATUS AND
HEALTH 18 (2000), available at http://www.crehpa.org.np/ogs/crehpa/index.htm
(last visited Nov. 2, 2003). It should be noted that despite their culpability at law,
those who performed abortions were rarely subject to criminal prosecution.
17. ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 39.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 43. The report gives as an example the plight of a woman, "Kali Maya," who
miscarried and was subsequently charged and convicted of abortion. At the time of
writing the report, she was serving a twenty year sentence.
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often charged with the very serious offence of infanticide.20 In such cases
a woman could be jailed for periods extending to twenty years and her
property confiscated. 2' According to a study completed in 1997, eighty
women were serving prison sentences for abortion/infanticide.22 This
23number represented 22.4% of all women imprisoned in the country.
The criminalization of abortion raised myriad concerns regarding
the rights of defendants and prisoners. The arrest, prosecution and im-
prisonment of women accused of abortion was highly problematic.
Women were often convicted based on insufficient evidence, without
the representation of a lawyer and without due process. 24 The denial of
basic due process rights was common regardless of existing constitu-
tional protections relating to them. 25 The right to criminal justice
enshrined in the Nepali Constitution did little to protect women ac-
cused of abortion or infanticide. 26 Uneducated women suffered
disproportionately from the lack of regard for their rights; many were
unable to read the statements they were asked to sign by police, did not
understand the nature of the charge(s) against them, and/or did not
know of their legal rights.27 Once detained, women and girls found that
there was insufficient food and unavailable or sporadic medical assis-
tance. 28 Of the eighty women detained for abortion or infanticide in
291997, court cases were still pending for the majority (56%) in 2000.
Convicted women were often forced to serve their sentences with their
young children since no other care arrangements were available for
them.3°
The foregoing, of course, only applied to women who survived
having a clandestine abortion. Many women died in the process.3 In
1998, the Nepali government reported a total of 4,478 maternal deaths
per year, placing Nepal among the countries with the highest maternal
mortality rates in the world. 2 Roughly 50% of all pregnancy-related
20. CREHPA, supra note 16, at 10.
21. ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 39-40.
22. CREHPA, supra note 16, at 12.
23. Id.
24. ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 63-77.
25. Id.
26. NEPAL CONST., art. XIV, § 4.
27. See CREHPA, supra note 16, at 12-14.
28. Id. at 8.
29. Id. at 16.
30. ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 24.
31. See CREHPA, supra note 16, at 23 (discussing the many negative health impacts of
clandestine abortions).
32. ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 23.
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deaths in the country were attributed to unsafe abortion." The leading
cause of hospital admissions for pregnant women was complications
arising from unsafe abortion (54%).3 In short, the criminalization of
abortion in Nepal had profound impacts on the physical and mental
health, welfare and long-term prospects of women who sought to termi-
nate their pregnancies.
B. Gender Inequality in Nepali Society
Considering the above discussion, it is difficult to conceive why
abortion continued to be subject to criminal penalty until so recently.
From a purely technical standpoint, abortion remained subject to
criminal sanction because of the failure on the part of the Nepali gov-
ernment to reform the antiquated Muluki Ain.35 The Muluki Ain was
drafted in the nineteenth century and was largely a codification of con-
servative and patriarchal Hindu philosophical texts." In the 1930s the
Nepali government revised the Muluki Ain to remove provisions that
discriminated on the basis of caste; provisions that discriminated on the
basis of gender were left untouched.37 The Muluki Ain was not reformed
again until 2002, when abortion was legalized. 8
From a social standpoint, the continued criminalization of abortion
resulted from the prevalence of patriarchal norms in Nepali society. 9
The now-repealed law relating to abortion is just one example of the
severe gender discrimination faced by Nepali women. The entrenched
cultural preference for sons results in the neglect of girls and women
from an early age. 40 Lower enrollment in school with significant dropout
33. Id. (This is compared to the global rate of 13% of maternal deaths due to unsafe
abortion. See CREHPA, supra note 16, at 1.).
34. Id. at 23 (citing GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL, FAMILY HEALTH DIVISION, MINISTRY OF
HEALTH, MATERNAL MORTALITY AND MORBIDITY STUDY, 67 (1998)).
35. Interview with Melissa Upreti, Legal Advisor for South Asia, The Center for Repro-
ductive Law and Policy, in New York, NY (Sept. 27, 2002).
36. ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 37 ("Dictated by Hindu religious principles
and beliefs, [the Muluki Ain] was rife with provisions that sanctioned caste-based and
gender-based discrimination.").
37. Id.
38. Interview with Upreti, supra note 35.
39. See SAPANA PRASHAN MALLA, THE FIRST CEDAW IMPACT STUDY: FINAL REPORT,
NEPAL 79 (Marilou McPhedran, et al. eds., 2000) ("Patriarchal values, deep rooted in
the social attitude, are controlling the family system, hence women have not been
able to practice their rights due to the social, cultural and religious value system.").
40. ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 30.
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rates, increased workloads in the home, and early marriages characterize
girls' and women's lives." There are severe restrictions on the ability of
women to inherit and own property.12 Until 2002, women could not
inherit property until they were thirty-five years old and then only if
they were and remained unmarried.3 In the labor force, "[women] sys-
tematically receive less pay than their male counterparts, despite a
constitutional guarantee of equal pay for equal work.""
As a result of these hardships, many Nepali women are ushered
into a "cycle of oppression and submission." 5 Such oppression is most46
often characterized by economic dependency 4-especially for women
from disadvantaged social groups." The role of many women oscillates
between caregiver and child-bearer. After marriage, girls and women are
expected to produce a son to ensure an heir to the family enterprise, the
longevity of the family name, and to replace the patriarch upon his pass-
ing. During and after bearing children, women are the main caregivers
to their husbands, children, and in-laws.49 Women are valued in relation
to their success in these various care-giving roles; they are valued rela-
tionally rather than individually.
In this light, the restriction of women's choices in relation to
reproduction is only one manifestation of a larger social phenomenon
whereby women are robbed of the opportunity to make autonomous
decisions.50 The exercise of autonomous decision-making by women is
often viewed as an attempt to disrupt the moral and social fabric of
41. Id.
42. Id. at 95 n.58.
43. Id.
44. Id. at31.
45. Id. at 30.
46. Id. at 31 ("These trends have stifled women's economic advancement and increased
their dependence on male family members, thereby severely limiting their ability to
voice their needs and to make independent decisions about their well-being.").
47. Id. at 30.
48. See University of Southampton, Reproductive Health Research, Opportunities and
Choices, Son Preference is Alive in Nepal Limiting Contraceptive Use and Keeping Fer-
tility High: Evidence from Nepali survey data, Fact Sheet 20, available at http://www.
socstats.soton.ac.uk/choices/Opp&Choices%/o2OFactsheet%/o2020.pdf (last visited
Nov. 19, 2003) (suggesting that "the level of son preference in Nepal is substantial.").
49. See United Nations Development Program, The Beijing + 5: Nepal Review (2000),
available at htrp://www.undp.org.np/publications/beijing5/chapO1.htm (last visited
Nov. 16, 2003)("[F]emale roles are associated with domestic work and rendering ser-
vices to the male members of their families.").
50. Note, however, that women's level of decision-making authority in the private and
public spheres varies according to caste. See ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 30.
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society." Women convicted of killing their fetus were often reported to
police by community leaders, 52 ostracized by their families, " or
otherwise marginalized. In the end, the continued criminalization of
abortion was an assertion of male control over female reproductive
capacity. It was an attempt to undermine the ability of women to make
autonomous choices, to be independent, and to reject the role of care-
giver/child-bearer. In this way, criminalization of abortion limited the
ability of Nepali women to challenge the patriarchal organization of
society. However, opposition to the criminalization of abortion gained
force throughout the 1990s.54
C. The Campaign to Legalize Abortion in
Nepal and the Role of INGOs
Nepal is a relatively young democracy, only shifting from monar-
chist rule to democracy on April 22, 1991." Women played a central
role in the movement to democracy, though they exercised relatively
little political power after its achievement.56 One of the most significant
challenges facing Nepal in its transition to democracy was establishing
democratic principles and the institutional framework to uphold them 7
Citizens unused to the democratic process had the difficult task of mo-
bilizing to protect their interests in an unfamiliar political order. Even
51. Seegenerally Malla, supra note 39.
52. ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 27 (recounting an inmate's story: "I told the
village elder that I had miscarried but he responded by saying 'You killed it!' I denied
killing it but he said 'It is held as murder,' and he reported me to the police.").
53. See id. ("No one in my family has ever come to visit me [in prison]"). See also id. at
43 (relating story of being taken to jail from the hospital and not being met by any
family members); see also id. at 57 ("No one ever comes to visit me. I have no idea
where my husband is. I don't even know if my parents know I am in prison.").
54. Id. at 32.
55. Malla, supra note 39, at 77.
56. See Saloni Singh, Women and Political Participation in Nepal, in PARTICIPATION-
PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT: ENLARGING PEOPLE'S CHOICES (2000), available at
http://www.nepan.org.np/publication/participatory/l3.pdf (last visited Nov. 14,
2003). See generally Nepal's Women Back Democracy, B.B.C. NEWS (May. 13, 1999),
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south-asia/342834.stm (last visited
Nov. 14, 2003).
57. See USAID, Nepal (2002), available at http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2002/ane/np/
(last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
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still, the somewhat fragmented women's movement that existed prior to
1991 became increasingly active after the end of monarchist rule.5"
In the early 1990s, civil society in Nepal flourished. The transition
to democracy and exposure to international developments in human
rights brought with it significant international moral and financial sup-
port for activism in Nepal.59 Women began to discuss more openly the
injustices they felt within the Nepali legal and social order. The absence
of property inheritance rights for women emerged as a central rallying
point for women's groups.6° For many Nepali women, the continued
denial of inheritance rights to women except in limited circumstances
typified Nepali patriarchal norms.6' Denying women equal inheritance
rights was seen as a central method of curtailing women's independence.
Through discussions regarding inheritance rights, women's groups be-
gan to question more deeply Nepal's patriarchal order. The agenda of
women's groups broadened to include "the right to safe, legal abortion,
safe motherhood, affirmative action in educational and political institu-
tions, the right of women to confer citizenship on their children," and
the end to child marriage, trafficking of girls and domestic violence.62
The analysis adopted by domestic grassroots women's groups was largely
feminist in orientation; it saw Nepali law as mirroring and reinforcing
the patriarchal norms that continued to oppress women.63
The mobilization of the women's movement culminated in the
1996 drafting of a Bill to revise the laws relating to property inheri-
tance."' Nepali women's groups, with the support of INGOs, drafted
the Bill.65 The Bill was defeated in Parliament; popular opinion sug-
gested that it was too revolutionary. 66 There was a fear, often expressed
58. ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 31-32 ("Following the disintegration of the
Panchayat regime in 1990, a plethora of women's rights groups emerged and the fo-
cus of these activists broadened to include issues ranging from property rights to
reproductive rights. Particularly over the last decade, women have been engaged in
persistent struggle to end discrimination and exploitation both in the private and
public spheres.").
59. Interview with Upreti, supra note 35.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 32.
63. Interview with Upreti, supra note 35.
64. Id.
65. Asian Women's Resource Exchange, Challenging Nepal's Inheritance Laws (1997),
available at http:/lwww.aworc.org/bpfa/pub/secf/ecoOO001.html (last visited Nov.
3, 2003).
66. See Shrish S. Rana, Inheritance Law Issues: What Values?, THE PEOPLE'S REVIEW
(Aug. 21, 1997), available at http://www.yomari.com/p-review/august97/august-2 I/
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by women, that reforming the inheritance law would upset the social
harmony of Nepali society and that it might even disadvantage women
by alienating them from their once-protective families.67 The fact that
the drafters had received money from international sources exposed the
Bill to criticism of being a foreign idea imposed on Nepal by the West.6"
The failure of the Bill was a setback for domestic women's groups.
Paralleling the Nepali women's movement was a campaign spear-
headed by public health officials to legalize abortion. 69 Government
public health experts were concerned with the link between the ex-
tremely high rate of maternal mortality in Nepal and the prevalence of
clandestine abortions. 7 Their concern was manifested in a private
member's Bill7' to legalize abortion tabled to Parliament in 1996.72 The
thrust of the public health officials' argument was that abortion should
be decriminalized to reduce the maternal mortality rate, not necessarily
due to concern over the rights of women.73 The Bill lapsed before it
could be voted on, largely due to a succession of different governments
and the general political instability that characterized Nepali politics in
the 1990s."
While the bills relating to property inheritance and abortion were
not passed, they did increase public discussion of issues pertaining to
women. The pronouncements coming out of the Beijing Conference in
1995 empowered Nepali women to continue their struggle for legal re-
form; they affirmed that their demands were not unreasonable and were
in fact an assertion of their rights.75
law.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2003) ("A bill that intends to amend the Civil Code re-
garding inheritance of paternal property with equal rights for women in mind is
typical of how Western values are perceived and fuel distorted demands on the plea
of modernism here [in Nepal].").
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Interview with Upreti, supra note 35.
70. Id.
71. A private member's Bill is one that is put forward by a member of Parliament on
his/her own accord and not necessarily with the support of his/her political party.
72. See ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 40 ("In 1996, Member of Parliament and
then President of the Family Planning Association of Nepal, Mr. Sunil Bhandari, in-
troduced a bill seeking to legalize abortion on certain grounds and to regulate
access.").
73. Interview with Upreti, supra note 35. Somewhat ironically, the Bill was entitled the
"Protection of Pregnancy Act."
74. CREHPA, supra note 16, at 31. See generally Holly Gayley, Gyanendra's Test: Nepal's
Monarchy in the Era of Democracy, 6:1 HARv. AsIA Q. (2001), available at http://
www.fas.harvard.edu/-asiactr/haq/200201/020 1a009.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
75. Interview with Upreti, supra note 35.
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In 1997, the Nepali government agreed to address the issue of gen-
der discrimination in the Muluki Ain, a turn-around that can be
attributed to the continued pressure being asserted on the government
by Nepali women's groups.76 The government's efforts were informed
by research undertaken by domestic nongovernmental organizations
("NGOs") who took the initiative to catalogue the discriminatory provi-
sions in the Muluki Ain and recommended reforms from a gender
perspective.77 This initiative resulted in the Muluki Ain 11 th Amendment
Bill, 1997 ("1 th Amendment Bill"). 78 The Bill was eventually passed by
Parliament in March 2002 and received royal assent in September 2002.79
Notable provisions in the 11 th Amendment Bill allowed for limited in-
heritance rights for women and legalized abortion.80
Under the new provisions, abortion is permitted on demand within
the first twelve weeks of pregnancy.8 Abortion is also permitted within
76. See AsIAN WOMEN'S RESOURCE EXCHANGE, supra note 65. The Forum for Women,
Law and Development (FWLD) coordinated the actions of seventy lawyers to bring a
case before the Nepali Supreme Court regarding inheritance rights for women under
Nepali law. Based on the Constitutional guarantee of equality, the Supreme Court
held that Parliament was required to introduce an appropriate Bill to remedy the dis-
criminatory inheritance laws.
77. Interview with Upreti, supra note 35.
78. ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 40.
79. Interview with Upreti, supra note 35.
80. See AsIAN WOMEN'S RESOURCE ExcHANGE, supra note 65. While the Bill affords
women property inheritance rights upon birth, it has been criticized by women's
groups because it requires a woman who inherits property to return it to the family if
she gets married.
81. Muluki Ain 2020 [Nepal Country Code 1963] (amended 2002), translated in E-mail
from Melissa Upreti, Legal Advisor for South Asia, The Center for Reproductive Law
and Policy, to Renu Mandhane (Oct. 24, 2002, 12:30 EST) (on file with author).
The amendments related to abortion read as follows:
The following provision (the new no. 28), shall replace the existing no. 28
of the Chapter on Life of the Muluki Ain:
No. 28. Anyone who has an abortion or causes an abortion, intentionally,
knowingly or despite having reasonable grounds to believe that an abortion
may result from their act shall be punished as follows:
Imprisonment for a year if the pregnancy is upto [sic] 12 weeks
Imprisonment for 3 years if the pregnancy is upto [sic] 25 weeks
Imprisonment for 5 years if the pregnancy is more than 25 weeks.
After provision no. 28, the following new provisions, no.s [sic] 28 (a) and
28 (b), have been added:
28 (a) The law prohibits anyone from forcing, threatening, tricking or pro-
viding incentives to a pregnant woman to have an abortion or to determine
the sex of the fetus with the intention of having an abortion. Anyone who
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the first eighteen weeks on the grounds of rape or incest; it is permitted
without regard to the duration of the pregnancy to save the life or health
of the woman, or where there is evidence of fetal impairment.
82
It was in the interim between the government initiating studies of
gender discrimination in the Muluki Ain in 1997 and the passing of the
1 th Amendment Bill in 2002 that CRLP became involved in Nepal.83
It worked in partnership with a NGO based out of Katmandu, the Fo-
rum for Women, Law and Development (FWLD). According to its
mission statement, CRLP is "dedicated to promoting women's equality
worldwide by guaranteeing reproductive rights as human rights."85 In
Nepal, CRLP's goal was to expose the continued criminalization of
abortion in Nepal as resulting in massive human rights violations. 86
CRLP wished to recharacterize what had, up until that point, been re-
garded as a public health issue, as an issue of human rights."87 It focused
not only on the economic, social and cultural rights violations resulting
from the ban, but also on the violation of civil and political rights.
causes a pregnant woman [to] have an abortion under such circumstances
or anyone who determines the sex of the fetus or causes a woman to deter-
mine the sex of the fetus with the intention of having an abortion shall be
liable to punishment of upto [sic] one year in prison and anyone who per-
forms or causes a sex selective abortion shall be punished with an additional
imprisonment term of one year.
28 (b) Notwithstanding anything mentioned in no. 28 of this chapter, in
the following circumstances and in accordance with the law as prescribed
by His Majesty's Government of Nepal, on the fulfdllment of the pre-
scribed grounds of eligibility and with the written permission of a medical
practitioner, an abortion on any of the following grounds shall not be con-
sidered a termination of pregnancy (i.e., a punishable act as defined in
section no. 28)
... if done within the first 12 weeks of the pregnancy, with the consent of
the woman
• .. if done within 18 weeks where the pregnancy is a result of rape or in-
cest, with the consent of the woman
... if failure to terminate the pregnancy will create a threat to the woman's
life or her physical health or mental health or if in the opinion of a quali-
fied (as per the requirements of the law) medical practitioner the child born
will be impaired, with the consent of the woman.
82. Id.
83. ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 5.
84. Id. CRLP and FWLD conducted a fact-finding mission in Nepal in March 2001, id.
at 23.
85. CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE LAW AND POLICY, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS ARE HuMAN
RIGHTS, 52 (2001).
86. Interview with Upreti, supra note 35.
87. Id.
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CRLP, in partnership with FWLD, undertook a fact-finding mis-
sion in Nepal in March 2001 .8 During the mission, staff attorneys from
CRLP and FWLD met with domestic women's advocates, women serv-
ing prison terms for abortion and related infanticide convictions, police
officers, members of the judiciary and government officials.89 CRLP and
FWLD summarized their findings in a report entitled Abortion in Nepal:
Women Imprisoned.90 Relying on binding international covenants to
which Nepal is a party, the report catalogued the human rights offenses
arising out of the criminalization of abortion in Nepal. The report sug-
gested that the following rights were being violated due to the
unavailability of safe and legal abortion: the right to life, 91 the right to
health, 92 the right to equality and non-discrimination," and the right to
reproductive self-determination. The report also concluded that,
88. ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 23 ("[T]his report exposes the government's
denial of Nepali women's right to safe and legal abortion and its violation of the
rights of criminal defendants who are prosecuted under the abortion prohibition.").
89. Id. at 24-25.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference on
Women, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20 (1996), Beijing, China, Sept. 4-15, 1995,
paras. 37-39, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/
platl.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2003) [hereinafter Beijing Platrm for Action]; Pro-
gramme ofAction of the International Conference on Population and Development, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1 (1995), Cairo, Egypt, Sept. 5-13, 1994, paras. 7.3,
7.15, 8.34, available at http://www.unfpa.org/icpd/icpd-poa.htm (last visited Nov.
3, 2003) [hereinafter ICPD Programme of Action]; Convention of the Rights of the
Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 166, U.N. Doc.
A/44/49 (1989) (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990), arts. 6.1, 6.2 [hereinafter Children's
Convention]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), art. 6.1 [hereinaf-
ter Civil and Political Rights Covenant]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA.
Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), art. 3 [hereinafter
Universal Declaration].
92. See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Discrimination Against Women
G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GOAR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46 (1979), at 193, U.N. Doc.
A/34/46, (entered into frrce Sept. 3, 1981) art. 12 [hereinafter CEDA I; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), (entered into force Jan. 4,
1976), art. 12(1) [hereinafter Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Covenant].
93. See, e.g., BeijingPlatformforAction, supra note 91, paras. 27, 44; CEDA W, supra note
92, arts. 1, 3; Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 91, art. 2.1; Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights Covenant, supra note 92, art. 2.2; ICPD Programme ofAc-
tion, supra note 91, principles 1,4; Universal Declaration, supra note 91, art. 7.
94. See, e.g., Beijing PlafbrmforAction, supra note 91, para. 37; CEDAW, supra note 92,
art. 16 (1.e). See also Children's Convention, supra note 91, arts. 6.1, 6.2, 16.1, 16.2;
Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 91, arts. 6.1, 9.1, 17.1; ICPD
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through the prosecution and imprisonment of women accused of abor-
tion, the following rights were being violated: the right to be free from
arbitrary arrest and detention, " the right to equality and non-
discrimination,96 the right to due process,97 and the right to humane
treatment in detention. 8
CRLP also wrote a letter to the United Nations Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the "Committee")." In 1999, in
furtherance of its treaty obligations, Nepal submitted a report to the
Committee outlining the measures it had taken to uphold its obligations
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.10° In relation to gender equality, Nepal noted that its Constitu-
tion and the Civil Liberties Act 1954 protected against discrimination.
Nepal stated that it had: "remained effortful to adopt necessary adminis-
trative as well as legislative measures, or to revise its existing legislative
provisions, in line with the international norms and principles in the
field of women's rights."' ° The CRLP letter was meant to aid the
Committee in preparation of its response to the Nepali report. In a let-
ter dated August 10, 2001, CRLP reminded the Committee that
women's reproductive rights were an integral part of the Committee's
Programme ofAction, supra note 91, principle 8; Universal Declaration, supra note 91,
art. 3.
95. Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 91, art. 9.1.
96. See, e.g., Beijing PlaqformforAction, supra note 91, paras. 9, 39; CEDA W, supra note
92, arts. 2, 15; Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 91, arts. 2, 14.1; Uni-
versal Declaration, supra note 91, art. 7.
97. Due process includes:
1. the right to be informed of the charges, and prompt proceedings (Civil
and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 91, art. 9.2);
2. the right to counsel (Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 91,
art. 14.3(d); Universal Declaration, supra note 91, art. 11(1));
3. the right to a fair and public hearing (Civil and Political Rights Covenant,
supra note 91, art. 14.1; Universal Declaration, supra note 91, art. 10);
4. the right to be presumed innocent;
5. the right to remain silent;
6. the right to be present at trial; and
7. the right to appeal a conviction.
98. Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 91, art. 7. See also Children's Conven-
tion, supra note 91, art. 37(c); Universal Declaration, supra note 91, art. 5.
99. Martinez & Upreti, supra note 8. The Committee is the treaty-monitoring body for
the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant, supra note 92.
100. Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Initial Reports Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant,
Addendum, Nepal, U.N. Doc. E/1990/5/Add.45 (2000).
101. Id. at 17.
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mandate. 112 The letter argued that the criminalization of abortion in
Nepal was resulting in the breach of various articles in the Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights Covenant.0 3
In its Concluding Observations in relation to Nepal, the Commit-
tee stated:
The Committee urges the State party to take remedial action
to address the problems of clandestine abortions, unwanted
pregnancies and the high rate of maternal mortality. In this re-
gard, the Committee urges the State party to reinforce
reproductive and sexual health programmes, in particular in
rural areas, and to allow abortion when pregnancies are life




This was a bold move on the part of the Committee since, as a
matter of policy, the United Nations does not promote the legalization
of abortion in countries where the practice is illegal. °5
Finally, CRLP sent comments to the Nepali government regarding
the first draft of the 11 th Amendment Bill.°10 The comments character-
ized abortion as a human rights issue and reminded Nepal of its
international commitments under various international human rights
covenants. °7 In particular, the memorandum noted Nepal's obligations
102. Martinez & Upreti, supra note 8, at 1 ("Women's reproductive rights form an inte-
gral part of the Committee's mandate. Article 12(i) of the ICESCR recognizes 'the
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health.' In interpreting the right to health, this Committee, in General
Comment 14, has explicitly defined this right to 'include the right to control one's
health and body, including sexual and reproductive freedoms."').
103. Id. ("We believe the situation discussed below [in relation to the prohibition of abor-
tion in Nepal] constitutes a serious violation of the Nepalese government's obligation
[to] ensure women's Reproductive Health, under articles 12, 10, and 15(1)(b) of the
ICESCR.").
104. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Nepal, 26th Sess., 44th-46th, 55th mtgs., para. 55, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.66
(2001) [hereinafter CESCR Concluding Observations: Nepal].
105. Nepal Legalizes Abortion in Response to United Nations Demands, Lifesite, Mar. 15,
2002, available at http://www.lifesite.net/ldn/2002/mar/02031502.html (last visited
Sept. 11, 2002) [hereinafter Nepal Legalizes Abortion].
106. Memo from CRLP to the Government of Nepal, supra note 7.
107. The instruments that Nepal has ratified (along with the dates entered into force in
Nepal) include: Children's Convention, supra note 91; Civil and Political Rights Cove-
nant, supra note 91; Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant, supra note 92;
CEDAW, supra note 92; Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, G.A. Res.
44/128, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, Annex at 207, U.N. Doc. A/44/49
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in relation to the rights to life and health, the right to equality and free-
dom from discrimination, and the right to autonomy in decision-
making in private matters.'08 The memorandum offered the Nepali gov-
ernment specific recommendations based on the text of the first draft of
the 11 th Amendment Bill.'0 9
The Nepali Parliament passed the 11 th Amendment Bill in March
2002.110 It did so two months after the final comments from the United
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights were re-
leased."' After King Gyanendra granted Royal Assent in September
2002, the 11 th Amendment Bill became law."
2
Despite the passing of the 11th Amendment Bill, roughly 30
Nepali women remain in prison on charges of abortion or infanticide.
There is no provision in the Bill requiring the release of these women."'
Melissa Upreti, a staff attorney at CRLP, stated: "Nepal's brutal abor-
tion law is now history, but the fate of those women imprisoned for
abortion is unclear. Women's equality under the law requires the gov-
ernment to take action and end this great injustice of imprisoning
women for abortion. ' Since passage of the 11 th Amendment Bill, ag-
gressive campaigning by domestic NGOs and INGOs has resulted in
the release of twenty-three women imprisoned for abortion as of January
(1989), (entered into force July 11, 1991); Convention Against Torture and Other
CrueZ Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, UN
GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) (Jun. 13,
1991); Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 59 (1966) (entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976); International Convention for the Elimination ofAll Forms of Ra-
cial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1965) (entered into
force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter Convention of Elimination of Racial Discrimination].
Moreover Nepal has signed documents negotiated at UN Conferences such as: Bei-
jing PlatFrrm for Action, supra note 91; ICPD Programme ofAction, supra note 91.
108. Memo from CRLP to the Government of Nepal, supra note 7, at 2-3.
109. See id. at 3-8.
110. Nepal Legalizes Abortion, supra note 105.
111. Id.
112. Press Release, The Center for Reproductive Rights, Nepal's King Legalizes Abortion:
A Victory for Nepalese Women and Advocated Worldwide (Sept. 26, 2002), avail-
able at http:/lwww.crlp.orglpr_02-0926nepal.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2003).
113. NepaL- Country Code (1 1th Amendment) Bill and Women's Rights; WOMEN LING
UNDER MUSLIM LAWS (Forum for Women, Law and Development, Nepal) 2002,
available at http://wluml.orglenglish/newsfulltxt.shtml?cmd[157] =x- 157-3355&cmd
[189]=x-189-3355 (last visited Oct. 19, 2002).
114. Press Release, The Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, Nepal Legalizes Abor-
tion: Next Step is to Release Women in Prison for Abortion (Mar. 14, 2002),
available at http://www.crlp.org/pr_-02_0314nepal.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2002).
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2004."5 Moreover, the government has begun working towards making
safe abortions accessible. In December 2003, Nepal's Ministry of Health
adopted a procedural order, which authorizes the provision of abortion
services in public hospitals and other government health facilities."
6
D. Evaluating the Outcome of the Campaign
For the most part, the Nepali campaign to legalize abortion was a
success. Passage of the 11 th Amendment Bill by Parliament signaled a
new approach to women's legal interests, including abortion. The new
approach involved giving the Constitutional principle of gender equality
formal recognition in the text of Nepali law. The movement from com-
plete ban to legalization was relatively swift. It took only six years from
the government rejecting the first Bill aimed at the legalization of abor-
tion, for abortion to become legal in most cases.
The success of the campaign can be attributed to three factors.
Foremost, the campaign to legalize abortion benefited from the political
climate surrounding the passage of the 1 1th Amendment Bill. The most
contested element of the 11th Amendment Bill was not the abortion
provision, but rather the provision related to property inheritance." 7
The notoriety of the property inheritance issue shifted Parliament's at-
tention away from any opposition to the legalization of abortion."
8
Thus, from a strategic point of view, it was easier to have abortion legal-
ized in an omnibus amendment to the Muluki Ain with other
controversial elements, rather than as a stand-alone Bill as was at-
tempted in the 1990s.
Second, the success of the campaign was largely a result of the
appeal to public health concerns. The pressure to legalize abortion did
not come solely from women's groups, who the public blamed for
attempting to upset social harmony." 9 Abortion was characterized by
government officials 20 and even the UN Committee on Economic,
115. The Center for Reproductive Rights, Landmark Order Establishes Safe Abortion Ser-
vices Throughout Nepal, available at http://crlp.org/ww-asia-nepal.htm (last visited
Feb. 13, 2004).
116. Id.
117. Interview with Upreti, supra note 35.
118. Id.
119. See Rana, supra note 66.
120. ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 33-36.
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Social and Cultural Rights21 as an issue tied to the high incidence of
maternal mortality. This made the abortion issue less controversial and
even 'marketable' to social conservatives.
Finally, in its attempts to gain legitimacy internationally, the new
democratic government in Nepal had become a party to many binding
international legal obligations.122 Arguments to legalize abortion that
had their basis in international human rights, such as those put forward
by CRLP, were more persuasive than they might have been in a more
established democracy. 23 There was at least some pressure on the Nepali
government to obey its international obligations, quite apart from con-
cerns regarding gender discrimination or public health.
124
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE WOMEN'S
HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT
Women's advocates from INGOs now commonly refer to women's
human rights. As the example from Nepal suggests, INGOs often rely
on human rights discourse when advocating for the interests of women.
However, human rights conventions, for the most part, were created by
and for men. 25 Human rights have not always included women's rights.
According to Catherine MacKinnon, "[r]ights that human beings have
by virtue of being human have not been rights to which women have
had access, nor have violations of women as such been part of the defi-
nition of the violation of the human as such on which human rights law
has traditionally been predicated."'
126
Part of the historical blindness of human rights analysis to issues of
gender stems from the fact that violations of women's rights do not take
place in the context of wars, prison cells, or torture chambers, but in the
121. CESCR Concluding Observations: Nepal, supra note 104, at para. 32 ("The Commit-
tee notes with deep concern the high rates of maternal mortality, especially in rural
areas, owing mainly to unsafe and illegal abortions .... ).
122. See Chinkin, supra note 9. Peterson suggests that conformity with international law is
essential to recognition of a new government. This likely includes conformity with
international human rights law.
123. Id. at 589. Chinkin suggests that in the 1990s, respect for human rights, democracy
and the rule of law were central to recognition of new governments, especially in
Eastern Europe.
124. See, e.g., CESCR Concluding Observations: Nepal, supra note 104.
125. Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Women 's Rights as Human Rights-Rules, Realities
and the Role of Culture: A Formulafor Reform, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 605 (1996).
126. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Rape, Genocide, and Women's Human Rights, 17 H.tv.
WOMEN'S L.J. 5 (1994) [hereinafter Rape, Genocide and Women's Human Rights].
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context of their everyday lives.'27 The fact that many women were, and
continue to be, denied access to safe and legal abortion is just one ex-
ample of a human rights violation that went unnoticed for decades
despite the existence of human rights protections. 28
While human rights documents dating back to 1945 formally rec-
ognize sex equality, women's human rights were rarely differentiated
from human rights in general. 29 Some suggest that the primary interna-
tional human rights treaties and organizations "do not appear to deal
specifically with violations of the human rights of women, except in a
marginal way or within the framework of other human rights issues."' 3°
Others suggest that "[i]nternational human rights and the legal instru-
ments that protect them were developed primarily by men in a male-
oriented world."' 31 The failure of existing conventions to take into ac-
count the specific human rights concerns of women resulted in the
drafting of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women ("CEDAW") in 1979."' CEDAW became
effective in 1981 and, as of June 2002, has been ratified by 170 coun-
tries.'33 Nepal ratified CEDAW on April 22, 1991.134
The drafting and ratification of CEDAW by states was a first step
in formulating a women's human rights discourse.'35 CEDAW was revo-
lutionary in its aim to protect a wide variety of women's rights,
including reproductive rights.'36 However, as with other human rights
127. Anthony P. Ewing, Establishing State Responsibility for Private Acts of Violence Against
Women Under the American Convention on Human Rights, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L.
REV. 751, 751 (1995); MacKinnon, supra note 126, at 5; Hernandez-Truyol, supra
note 125.
128. Rebecca J. Cook, Women's International Human Rights Law: The Way Forward, in
HuMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 19 (Re-
becca Cook ed., Univ. of Pa., 1994) [hereinafter Cook].
129. See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 91.
130. Laura Reanda, Human Rights and Women's Rights: The United Nations Approach, 3:1
HUM. RTs. Q. 12 (1981).
131. Cook, supra note 128, at 10.
132. CEDAW, supra note 92.
133. For a complete list of parties to CEDAW see http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/
cedaw/states.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2004).
134. See United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of
the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, available at http://www.unhrc.ch
(last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
135. Cook, supra note 128, at 10-11 (suggesting that CEDAW "progresses beyond earlier
human rights conventions by addressing the pervasive and systematic nature of dis-
crimination against women.").
136. CEDAW, supra note 92, art. 12. Note that CEDAW fails to mention a right to safe
and legal abortion.
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conventions, CEDAW only resulted in formal recognition of women's
human rights. Many states that signed CEDAW did not take it seriously
and viewed women's human rights as a marginal issue. 137 A number of
states noted substantive reservations to the international convention.1
8
Thus, despite the existence of CEDAW, one must understand that
the women's human rights movement was not initiated by governments
or through the intergovernmental system.'39 Instead, it was the result of
aggressive campaigning on the parts of women's groups and INGOs. 4 °
The 1990s marked the beginning of forceful campaigning by INGOs
for women's human rights. For example, CRLP was established in
1992 in order to advocate for the protection of women's reproductive
rights, which had traditionally been viewed as a public health issue.1
The campaign to bring women's interests into the discourse of
human rights met with great success at the international conferences in
Vienna,141 Cairo,1 44 and Beijing.'45 Indeed, Amnesty International, in its
campaign leading up to the Beijing Conference, emphasized the catch-
phrase "women's rights are human rights" as a guiding principle for
negotiation of the Declaration and Platform for Action. 146 One indica-
tion of the Amnesty International campaign's success was Hillary
Rodham Clinton's announcement in Beijing that "women's rights are
human rights.' 47 Her words were significant because they came from a
mainstream political figure, representing what is arguably the most
powerful nation in the world. In the new millennium, the "women's
137. Jo Lynn Southard, Protection of Women ' Human Rights under the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 8 PACE INT'L. L. Rav. 1,
18 (1996).
138. Id. For a complete list of states who have registered reservations see http://
www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2004).
139. Hernandez-Truyol, supra note 125, at 617.
140. Id.
141. For example, Human Rights Watch's launched its Women's Human Rights Project
in 1990. CRLP was established in 1992.
142. The Center for Reproductive Rights, supra note 3.
143. Vienna Declaration and Programme ofAction, World Conference on Human Rights, UN
Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993), Vienna, Austria, Jun. 14-25, 1994, available at
http://www.hri.ca/vienna+5/vdpa.shtml (last visited Oct. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Vi-
enna Declaration].
144. ICPD Programme ofAction, supra note 91.
145. Beijing Platform for Action, supra note 91.
146. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, WOMEN'S RIGHTS ARE HUMAN RIGHTS: COMMITMENTS
MADE BY GovERNMENTS IN THE BEIJING DECLARATION AND PLATFORM FOR ACTION,
1-2, (1996) available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGIOR410051996/
(last visited Oct. 24, 2003).
147. Clinton, supra note 1.
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rights are human rights" approach has come to dominate the field in
terms of INGO advocacy to protect women's interests.
IV. THE PERSUASIVENESS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
DISCOURSE AND RELATED CRITIQUES
Given the focus of INGOs on human rights discourse in their ef-
forts to secure the interests of women globally, it is helpful to consider
the rationales underlying this approach. However, given that the central
goal of this paper is to consider some of the implications of exclusive use
of human rights discourse by INGOs, the rationales will also be cri-
tiqued. Despite the complexity of the issues, as the Nepal example
indicates, advocacy based on principles of human rights is oftentimes
very effective. Even still, there must be critical analysis of this trend, if
only to determine that it is the most appropriate mode of advocating for
women's interests.
A. Universalism
An underlying reason for the reliance of INGOs on human rights
discourse in efforts to secure women's interests is the discourse's univer-
salist orientation.'4 8 The presumption that human rights are universal is
illustrated in human rights instruments. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights provides that the rights contained therein are "a com-
mon standard of achievement for all people and all nations."'49 The
rights articulated in CEDAW are assumed to be equally applicable to all
women, regardless of their race or sexuality. 5 ° These documents rarely
afford a role for culture in the performance or nonperformance of their
obligations. Indeed, CEDAW specifically states that efforts to eliminate
discrimination against women may require state parties to take measures
to modify existing customs or practices that discriminate against women
and thereby violate their human rights; it actually privileges universal
human rights (i.e., non-discrimination) over cultural considerations.'
148. For a general discussion of the universalist nature of human rights see INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 193 (Henry J. Steiner
& Philip Alston, eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1996).
149. Universal Declaration, supra note 91, at Preamble.
150. Southard, supra note 137, at 3.
151. CEDAW, supra note 92, arts. 2(0, 5(a).
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In many ways, it is very attractive to suggest that human rights are
the entitlement of every person, regardless of culture, religion, national-
ity, or gender. 5 ' In terms of women's human rights, universalism allows
advocates to bring to light the fact that gender concerns are common to
all countries, cultures and religions.'53 The universal nature of human
rights lends legitimacy to efforts of INGOs based in the Global North
that operate abroad. By relying on a universalist framework, such or-
ganizations can avoid suggestions that they are privileging their own
cultural norms above those of the particular society in question. Instead,
such INGOs are seen as working to protect the rights that are common
to all women.
The usefulness of a universalist discourse in the advocacy of IN-
GOs is illustrated by the campaign to legalize abortion in Nepal. CRLP
envisioned its role in Nepal as highlighting the human rights abuses that
resulted from the criminalization and prosecution of abortion. 54 In this
regard, CRLP did not argue that Nepal should follow the lead of most
Western countries, such as the United States, in legalizing abortion. Nor
did it attack the legitimacy of Nepali cultural norms that played a role
in the continued criminalization of abortion. Beyond the obvious dis-
taste of these arguments, advancing them, especially given CRLP's status
as an INGO based in the Global North, may have exposed it to attacks
of cultural imperialism. In this regard, the universalist orientation of
human rights discourse is likely very attractive to INGOs doing work
abroad, especially in the Global South.'55
1. Western Cultural Imperialism
Despite its strengths, the universalist nature of human rights is also
a shortcoming. The claim that human rights are universal has been the
subject of much controversy. 156 Human rights norms have been attacked
as only representing the Western liberal notion of rights, 57 and therefore
152. This is also one of the most contentious aspects of human rights discourse, as will be
discussed below.
153. Hernandez-Truyol, supra note 125 ("[A]s far as universally enjoying human rights-
women simply do not. This is a true in the West as it is in the East, and in the North
as it is in the South.").
154. ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 23.
155. The term "Global South" is used to refer to developing countries, including the least
developed countries.
156. See STEINER, supra note 148, at 192-194 (discussing the debate between universalists
and cultural relativists).
157. Id. at 187-91.
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inapplicable to non-Western societies. 58 Critics have suggested that re-
quiring compliance with human rights norms is an attempt by the West
to impose its own set of cultural values on non-Western countries. '"
There is a suggestion that advocacy based on human rights is tantamount
to cultural imperialism. 160 While allegations of cultural imperialism may
be extreme, it is clear that there is dissatisfaction amongst some non-
Western states regarding the nature of the underlying norms that are
reflected in human rights discourse. Indeed, since the signing of the first
human rights treaties, there has been questioning of whether human
rights are or ever can be truly universal.'
In regard to INGOs advocating for women's interests internation-
ally, the cultural critique of human rights theory must be taken
seriously. Given that most human rights INGOs are based in the Global
North, and human rights analysis is often viewed as a product of West-
ern liberal traditions, human rights INGOs use of the the analysis may
lack legitimacy in other countries. This will especially be the case when
INGO advocacy is focused on countries where there is no indigenous
concept of liberal rights, such as those that are primarily community-
based.' 62 While Nepal has signed numerous international human rights
covenants before CRLP became involved in the domestic campaign to
158. Charles Taylor, Human Rights: The Legal Culture, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF RIGHTS 49-51 (United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization,
1986).
159. Bilahari Kausikan, Asia's Different Standard, 92 FOREIGN POLICY 24 (1993) at 33
(arguing that the West's increasing focus on democracy and human rights in interna-
tional relations has its basis in ideology: "The West needs its myths; missionary zeal
to whip the heathen along the path of righteousness and remake the world in its own
image is deeply ingrained in Western (especially American) political culture.... The
self-congratulatory tone of much of Western commentary at the end of the Cold War
and the current triumphalism of Western values grate on East and Southeast
Asians.").
160. Guyora Binder, Cultural Relativism and Cultural Imperialism in Human Rights Law, 5
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 211, 217 (1999) ("[T]he cultural relativism critique of in-
ternational human rights law implies the charge of imperialism. Implicit in the
cultural relativism critique is an interpretation of human rights advocacy as the claim
that non-western peoples should be governed by western opinions rather than their
own.").
161. Statement on Human Rights, in 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 539, 542 (1947) ("Stan-
dards and values are relative to the culture from which they derive so that any
attempt to formulate postulates that grow out of the beliefs or moral codes of one
culture must to that extent detract from the applicability of any Declaration of Hu-
man Rights to mankind as a whole.").
162. This should be differentiated from rogue states that suggest that human rights are not
universal in order to justify mass violations thereof. See JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 119 (1989).
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legalize abortion, CRLP was the first group to highlight the lack of safe
and legal abortion as a violation of women's human and reproductive
rights. 6 1 It is at least plausible that this was because domestic women's
groups did not identify with the Western liberal concept of human
rights analysis. Such groups preferred to frame the abortion issue as be-
ing related to public health1' or the patriarchal social structures within
Nepali society. 165 The fact that domestic women's groups often do not
use the language of women's human rights must be acknowledged and
seriously considered by INGOs that frame their analysis in terms of
rights.
2. Victimization
Another critique of the universalist notion of human rights is that
it leads to application of a victim rhetoric when addressing issues per-
taining to women in the Global South. On this theory, the INGO focus
on women's human rights emphasizes the victimization of women, es-
pecially when advocacy is aimed at ending violence against women.
According to Professor Ratna Kapur: "[I]n the context of law and hu-
man rights, it is invariably the abject victim subject who seeks rights,
primarily because she is the one who has had the worst happen to
her."' Kapur argues that the victimization rhetoric at play in interna-
tional women's rights discourse is problematic for three reasons. 67 First,
the rhetoric essentializes the experiences of women by suggesting that all
women are victims and victimized in the same way. Second, it is based
upon cultural essentialism such that women in the Global South are
seen as victims of their culture, while Western culture is not held to the
same degree of scrutiny."' Finally, victimization rhetoric invites protec-
tionist responses from states, which do little to empower women or
promote women's rights. ° Kapur suggests that discourse focused on the
empowerment of women fails to avoid the tendency to view women in
163. Interview with Upreti, supra note 35.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Rana Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the "Native" Subject
in International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics, 15 Hlkv. HUM. RTs. J. 1, 5
(2002).
167. Id. at6.
168. Id. at 6, 7-12.
169. Id. at 6, 13-17.
170. Id. at 6-7, 17-21.
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the Global South as victims.171 In this regard, the exclusive focus on uni-
versalist human rights discourse by INGOs is problematic.
3. The Impossibility of Privileging Particular People's Rights
Another potentially troublesome, though highly attractive, aspect
of the universalist orientation of rights language is the impossibility of
privileging certain people's rights over those of other people.1 72 It would
violate the universalist notion of human rights to suggest that certain
people's rights deserve greater protection than other's. But what if the
exercise of one person's rights infringes on the ability of another person
to exercise his/her rights? Whose rights do we protect? Logically, we
would privilege the exercise of rights that is more consistent with the
values we wish to promote in society. Human rights theory does not
allow for this type of logical inquiry. Because human rights discourse
does not privilege certain rights or societal goals, it cannot transcend this
conflict of rights.' 7' While there might be an attempt to "balance"
rights, there can be no formal privileging. This can pose a significant
obstacle when- advocating for women's rights.
In its campaign, CRLP characterized the denial of safe and legal
abortion as violating women's rights to life, health, equality, non-
discrimination, and reproductive self-determination. 174 What would
happen if an anti-choice group also adopted the human rights language
to suggest that allowing women to have abortions without the consent
of the father of the unborn child violates the father's right to privacy,
17
1
right to found a family,176 right to freedom of religion,'7 or the "rights"
171. Id. at 21.
172. See generally Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63
TEx. L. REv. 387, 388 (1984) ("Rights theory does not indicate which of the two
values-freedom or security-the decisionmaker should choose in a given case
(where these values are in conflict]. Because it cannot transcend this fundamental
conflict of values, rights theory does not offer an adequate basis for legal decisions.").
173. There has been some attempt to come up with a set of fundamental rights, which
usually correspond to the civil and political rights. See, e.g., Theodoor C. van Boven,
Distinguishing Criteria of Human Rights, in 1 INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF Hu-
MAN RIGHTS 43 (Karel Vasak & Philip Alston eds., 1982). However, there is no
consensus in this regard and many see such an exercise as problematic. See, e.g.,
Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 Am. J. INT'L L. 1,
21-23 (1986).
174. ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 45.
175. Universal Declaration, supra note 91, art. 12.
176. Id. art. 16(1).
177. Id. art. 18.
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of the unborn child?178 This is not an academic exercise; these are the
very arguments advanced by self-defined "liberal" anti-choice groups.171
The problem with human rights analysis is that it does not allow us to
privilege the woman's rights over those of the father (or unborn
child)."' 0 We may choose to do so, as was done in Roe v. Wade'8' or R. v.
Morgentaler, 8 2 but this involves going outside the rights framework. It
involves making value judgments, which do not form part of the dis-
course of human rights.'83 Thus, an INGO that employs the language of
human rights in its advocacy must be prepared to go outside the dis-
course if confronted with challenges to their inherent privileging of
women's rights over the potential rights of others.
4. Formal Equality
Finally, and related to the foregoing critique, it is at least arguable
that securing human rights for women only guarantees formal equality
to women rather than substantive equality.184 By advocating within a
universalist human rights framework, INGOs can only ask that women
be afforded the same rights as men-i.e., that they be treated equally to
men. However, as feminists have long pointed out, formal equality is
often insufficient to secure substantive equality. To ensure the latter, we
may need to treat women differently-to afford them "more" rights so
to speak. However, due to its universalist orientation, human rights dis-
course is unable to accommodate the idea that some people might be
178. In the Anglo-American tradition, it is not widely accepted that unborn children have
rights.
179. PRO-LIFE LIBERALS, A PROGREsSIvE ARGUMENT AGAINST ABORTION, available at
http://www.prolife.liberals.com/basics.html (last modified Sept. 8, 1997) (arguing
that fetal rights are a natural progression of the human rights framework and that the
fetus' right to life must be respected).
180. See CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 145 (1989) (in describing the
various problems with rights language for women, Smart argues that a wife or child's
right not to be molested may be balanced against the legally-recognized rights of the
husband and that courts are reluctant to privilege one person's rights over the other).
181. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing the women's right to privacy as paramount to
other interests in relation to abortion).
182. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (Can.) (recognizing the women's "right to life, liberty and secu-
rity of the person" as paramount to other interests in relation to abortion).
183. Olsen, supra note 172.
184. Formal equality aims at de jure equality-i.e., treating likes alike. Formal equality
requires that men and women are treated the same. Substantive equality, however,
aims at achieving defacto equality such that women might be treated differently than
men in order to ensure an equitable outcome.
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entitled to more rights than others. For example, in Nepal, it is arguable
that securing the right to safe and legal abortion does not ensure the
substantive equality of women. Substantive equality would require en-
suring that women be able to exercise their rights fully and this may
require granting women additional rights. Unfortunately, this is not a
claim that INGOs could make within the universalist discourse of hu-
man rights.
B. The Existence of Binding Legal Obligations
Human rights were created through multilateral treaties. While the
notion of basic human rights likely existed prior to the end of the First
World War, the wide range of rights currently protected under human
rights regimes did not form part of customary international law. Human
rights discourse as we know it only became part of international dia-
logue after the signing of the Charter of the United Nations."' Today
there are many binding international legal covenants related to the pro-
tection of human rights.
1 86
The existence of binding and enforceable legal obligations related
to human rights makes the discourse attractive to INGOs for three rea-
sons. First, the existence of CEDAW, for example, takes women's
human rights outside the realm of feminist theory or moral philosophy
and into the sphere of law.'87 While assertions of morality are often seen
as varying across cultures, international law is applicable regardless of
such differences. In this manner, the existence of binding legal cove-
nants related to human rights affords INGOs a partial response to the
allegations of cultural relativists: this is not about immorality, it is about
illegality. In Nepal, CRLP did not say that the rights abuses resulting
185. Charter of the United Nations, adopted June 26, 1945, 59 Star. 1031, T.S. 993, 3
Bevans 1153, entered into force Oct. 24, 1945. See STEINER, supra note 148, at 118,
122 ("[Tlhe United Nations Charter itself first gave formal and authoritative expres-
sion to the human rights movement that began at the end of World War II....
Through interpretation and extrapolation, the sparse text [of the Charter] has consti-
tuted a point of departure for inventive development of the entire movement.").
186. The website for the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has a
comprehensive listing of international human rights instruments available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/intlinst.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2003).
187. Of course, it is arguable whether international law, and especially international hu-
man rights law, can be equated to the hard law of domestic contracts or torts.
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from the criminalization of abortion were immoral; it said that they
were illegal.'88
Second, human rights norms backed by the force of international
law allow INGOs to engage the legal and political system of the country
alleged to be in violation of such rights. Relying on covenants that the
government itself has signed may force it to be more responsive to the
concerns raised by INGOs. In Nepal, allegations of illegality allowed the
CRLP to engage the legal and political system, especially since Nepal
had recently signed a number of international human rights conven-
tions."'
Finally, the legal underpinnings of human rights discourse may be
useful in the drafting of legal and policy materials by INGOs. It is easier
to structure reports, legal briefs, position papers, and recommendations
around established and objective criteria such as violations of interna-
tionally recognized human rights covenants. Such documents can often
be submitted to treaty monitoring bodies, governments, other INGOs,
the media, and other actors that have the ability to exert some degree of
pressure on governments.
Again, the report issued by CRLP, Abortion in Nepal: Women Im-
prisoned, is illustrative. It is a report structured around the violation of
human rights. The report also recommends that NGOs operating in
Nepal "[u]se the international mechanisms for enforcement of human
rights treaties, including opportunities to submit reports to treaty moni-
toring bodies and file complaints under the optional protocols to the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW) and the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights . .. ""0
Indeed, CRLP submitted a letter to the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, as well as a memorandum to the Nepali
government, both of which are structured around the violation of hu-
man rights covenants."' These documents illustrate the usefulness of
being able to structure reports and recommendations around the estab-
lished legal system for the protection of human rights. It allows for more
effective lobbying of government.
188. ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 45-83. See also Memo from CRLP to the Gov-
ernment of Nepal, supra note 104.
189. Abortion in Nepal, supra note 4, at 45-83.
190. Id.at 18.
191. Martinez & Upreti, supra note 8; Memo from CRLP to the Government of Nepal,
supra note 104.
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1. The Focus on Discrete Rights and Individual Wrongs
In using the language of human rights, INGOs must address issues
in terms of discrete rights violations against individuals.92 For example,
in Nepal, CRLP highlighted the way in which the criminalization of
abortion resulted in a number of specific violations to human rights
treaties. 9 ' However, there may be instances where the injustice encoun-
tered does not clearly relate to the violation of a particular right against
an individual; this is often the case in relation to injustices arising due to
gender inequality.' In such instances, INGOs that focus exclusively on
human rights discourse may be unable to argue that the injustice in
question is illegal and must be addressed. In countries where there tend
not to be flagrant human rights abuses related to individual women, the
exclusive focus on human rights analysis may curtail the effectiveness of
INGO advocacy.
2. The Human Rights System as Privileging Certain Rights
While the binding legality of human rights covenants makes the
discourse attractive, relying on such covenants forces INGOs to accept
the informal hierarchy of rights at play within the system. Human rights
192. SMART, supra note 180, at 145 ("A third problem with rights is that they are often
formulated to deal with a social wrong, yet they are always ... focused on the indi-
vidual who must prove that her rights have been violated.").
193. ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 45-83.
194. CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 22 (2001) [hereinafter SaX EQuALITY]:
[L]egal systems since the Enlightenment have recognized rights for indi-
viduals one at a time-either as a unique self or as an undifferentiated
member of humanity-but rarely as members of social groups. Social
groups are seen to make persons "different," while their individuality and
common humanity makes them "the same." Human rights are thus seen as
individual rights, not rights deriving from group membership, whether as-
cribed to individuals as members of groups or to groups as such. Group
membership has been seen to be in tension with humanity understood in
individual or universal terms, not as constitutive of it. Group membership
can be used to socially define people as unequal to one another; yet mem-
bership in social groups undeniably shapes people in their particularity and
in their humanity. Group membership does not simply distinguish hu-
mans; it is part of being human. Similarly, each woman who is
discriminated against as a woman is personally harmed, certainly, but she is
harmed in and because of her status as a member of the group women. The
injuries harm each woman but the basis on which the harm is done is
group-based and collectively shared.
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discourse is problematic because of the historic privileging of civil and
political rights over economic, social, and cultural rights.'95 Formally,
both sets of rights are acknowledged to be "universal, indivisible, inter-
dependent and interrelated."'
9 6
In practice, however, state parties to the Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights Covenant rarely take particular measures to implement such
rights.' 9 This is in part because the Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights Covenant only requires states to strive towards "progressive reali-
zation" of the rights therein as per Article 2(1). Beyond the textual
ambiguity of the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant, the
under-development of such rights has been attributed to three factors:
1) the ambivalence of most governments to take action, 2) the reluc-
tance of INGOs to focus specifically on economic and social rights, and
3) the lack of innovative legal and other approaches to implementa-
tion."8
CRLP was not reluctant to focus specifically on economic and so-
cial rights in its campaign in Nepal. It highlighted many of the
economic and social rights that were violated by failing to provide safe
and legal abortions to Nepali women.9 ' It also highlighted the civil and
political rights at issue due to the prosecution of women who had un-
dergone illegal abortions."° There is strategic value in pointing out civil
and political rights violations in addition to those relating to economic,
social and cultural rights; it makes for a stronger case because of the
privileging of civil and political rights in the human rights framework.
While CRLP was able to point to numerous civil and political
rights violations resulting from the abortion ban in Nepal, this may be
more difficult in other campaigns to protect women's interests. It is rela-
tively easy to imagine situations where women's economic, social and
cultural rights are the only rights at issue. Examples are: access to hous-
ing, the availability of food and safe drinking water, and the
affordability of contraceptives. Indeed, some of the most pressing prob-
lems facing the women's movement, such as the trafficking of women
and girls, the feminization of poverty, the rising number of women with
AIDS, and female genital mutilation, are all issues concerning almost
exclusively economic, social, and cultural rights.
195. STEINER, supra note 148, at 256.
196. Vienna Declaration, supra note 143, para. 5.
197. STEINER, supra note 148, at 256.
198. Id. at 269.
199. ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 45-56.
200. Id. at 59-83.
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The historical privileging of civil and political rights over eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights is especially problematic for women.
Due to pervasive and historically-defined gender roles, women tend to
have a particular interest in the protection of their economic, social and
201
cultural rights. Women, especially in the Global South, are often care-
givers to their families, are responsible for obtaining clean water and
buying food, are stand-in doctors when medical services are unavailable
202
or unaffordable, and so on. Moreover, as marginalized members of
society, and due to the growing feminization of poverty, women are of-
ten not in positions of power and consequently cannot effectively
demand the protection of their economic, social and cultural rights.2°3
201. ALISON SYMINGTON, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS, 1-2 (2002) ("The ICESCR is an instrument with particular im-
portance for gender advocates, not least because women have different needs and
experiences than men in economic, social and cultural spheres and often have the
most at stake when those rights are not protected.").
202. Shelagh Day, Leilani Farha, Marianne Mollmann et al., Montreal Principles of
Women s Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (manuscript at 2-3), HUM. RTs. Q.
(forthcoming).
The inequality in the lives of women that is deeply embedded in history,
tradition and culture affects women's access to and enjoyment of eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights. To ensure women's enjoyment of these
rights, they must be implemented in a way that takes into account the con-
text in which women live. For example, the traditional assignment to
women and girls of the role of primary care-giver for children, older per-
sons and the sick restricts women's freedom of movement and
consequently their access to paid employment and education. The eco-
nomic and social devaluation of the work, paid and unpaid, that women
traditionally do from a very young age, contributes further to fixing
women in a position of economic and social inequality. These factors di-
minish women's earning capacity and their economic autonomy, and
contribute to the high rates of poverty among women worldwide. Tradi-
tional, historical, religious or cultural attitudes are also used to justify and
perpetuate discrimination against women in the delivery of economic, so-
cial and cultural rights, including health services and education, by public
and private agencies.
203. Id. at 3.
Inequality in women's enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights
contributes to their economic dependence, denial of personal autonomy
and lack of empowerment. These in turn limit still further women's ability
to participate in public life, including fora for economic, social, political
and legal policy and decision-making .... Economic, social and cultural
rights and civil and political rights are particularly indivisible and intercon-
nected in the lives of women: inequality in economic, social and cultural
rights undermines women's ability to enjoy their civil and political rights,
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The Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant includes
rights relating to social security,204 protection of the family,2°5 consensual
marriage,2 °6 standard of living, physical and mental healthy, and edu-
cation.2° As mentioned, these are all areas of particular concern to
women due to historically-defined gender roles. Thus, women often
have the most to lose when economic, social and cultural rights are not
protected to the same extent as civil and political rights. The historical
privileging of civil and political rights over economic, social and cultural
rights, coupled with the tremendous positive impact that the latter
could have on women, is a major flaw in the current human rights sys-
tem. This flaw may seem relatively unproblematic when there is a civil
and political rights dimension to a women's issue, but may prove more
difficult when the issue at hand relates only to the protection of eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights.
C. The Relative Force of Human Rights Obligations
In many countries where INGOs operate, international human
rights treaties have more force than domestic constitutional protec-
tions. 2' ° This is especially the case in new and unstable democracies.
Nepal provides an example. According to CRLP, "[d]espite constitu-
tional guarantees of equality and freedom, Nepali women continue to
experience severe gender discrimination. 21' In their fact-finding mis-
sion, CRLP found that interpretation of the Nepali Constitution to
protect and promote women's interests was inconsistent and that judges
continued to use religion as a legal basis for justifying gender discrimina-
which then limits their capacity to influence decision and policy-making in
public life.
204. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant, supra note 92, art. 9.
205. Id. art. 10.
206. Id.
207. Id. art. 11.
208. Id. art. 12.
209. Id. arts. 13-14.
210. This is in direct contrast to Western democracies, such as the United States or Can-
ada, where constitutional protections are stronger than international legal obligations.
Indeed, in both these countries, provisions in their respective constitutions were re-
lied upon to secure the right to safe and legal abortion. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (discussing the right to privacy) and R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1
S.C.R. 30 (Can.) (discussing the right to life, liberty and security of the person).
211. ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 11.
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tion.1 2 Therefore, while Nepal has constitutional guarantees that could
have been interpreted to include a right to safe and legal abortion and to
procedural safeguards in the criminal process, they were viewed as inef-
fective. As a result, CRLP focused on holding Nepal accountable not to
its Constitution but to binding human rights documents.2 13 Nepal is a
striking example of a country in which the use of human rights dis-
course by INGOs is poised to be most effective.
1. Instances Where Human Rights Obligations Lack Strength
There are instances where human rights obligations will lack
strength due to the political context in a particular country. Some coun-
tries are not party to any of the major human rights treaties, or are
highly skeptical of them. For example, Singapore tends to be highly
critical of what it considers to be Western cultural imperialism, 2 has
not acceded to the majority of international human rights conven-
tions," 5 and has been condemned for various human rights violations in
the past. 6 In such a country, advocacy based on international human
rights norms may fall upon deaf ears.
In other instances, international human rights norms may lack rela-
tive strength when compared to domestic constitutional protections. For
example, in the United States, most human rights treaties are not self-
executing, meaning that they are not the law of the land unless Congress
enacts specific legislation to that effect. 21 7 The United States has not yet
212. Id. at 37.
213. Id. at 23-24.
214. See Simon S.C. Tay, Human Rights, Culture, and the Singapore Example, 41 McGILL
L.J. 743 (1996).
215. Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of
the Principal International Human Rights Treaties (Nov. 2, 2003), available at
http:l/www.unhchr.chlpdflreport.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2003) (showing that Sin-
gapore has only ratified CEDAW and the Children's Convention).
216. Tay, supra note 214, at 745 ("[Singapore] has recently faced Western critics over
issues such as the caning of a youth from the United States, judicial proceedings for
contempt of court against a foreign academic and an international newspaper, and
social controls such as a ban on chewing gum." (citations omitted)).
217. See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (Oxford
Univ. Press 2d ed. 1996), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/kingsburyb/
fall01/indlaw/PROTECTED/unit4/unit4.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2003) [hereinaf-
ter HENKIN]. For a further discussion of U.S. protection of international human
rights, see Amy C. Harfeld, Oh Righteous Delinquent One: The United States' Interna-
tional Human Rights Double Standard-Explanation, Example, and Avenues for
Change, 4 N.Y. CITY L. Rav. 59 (2001).
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ratified CEDAW, but protects women against discrimination through
the United States Constitution."' Indeed, abortion rights were granted
to women due to the protection of privacy in the United States Consti-
tution, and not as a result of international human rights obligations. 9
In countries where constitutional protections are stronger than interna-
tional human rights norms, INGO advocacy based on human rights
discourse may be less effective than it was in Nepal. This must be a con-
sideration when determining the discursive technique that will more
effectively secure the interests of women.
D. Pressure from the International Community
Another reason to frame advocacy to protect women's interests in
terms of human rights is the fact that there is strong pressure from the
international community, especially the Global North, to conform to
human rights treaties. Many states in the Global North condemn the
rights violations occurring in the Global South. 20 Sometimes the result
is the imposition of sanctions or other coercive measures to ensure com-
pliance.22' As such, compliance with human rights norms is often viewed
222as a method of establishing legitimacy for new democracies. As a re-
sult, INGO advocacy based on human rights norms is likely to be very
effective in new democracies or countries seeking approval from the
Global North.
For example, in Nepal, the new democratic government signed and
ratified (with virtually no reservations) almost all of the major interna-
tional human rights treaties.223 It did this in order to signal to the world
218. The Center for Reproductive Rights, CEDAW: The Importance of U.S. Ratification
(June 2003), available at http://www.crlp.org/pub fac-cedaw.html (last visited Oct.
24, 2003). The United States has not yet ratified CEDAW, despite having signed it
in 1980. However, women in the U.S. enjoy substantial rights due to the nondis-
crimination provisions in the United States Constitution.
219. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
220. See United States Department of State, Human Rights Reports (2002), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2003). The Nepal
country report, released Mar 31, 2003, states: "The Government's human rights re-
cord remained poor, and it continued to commit numerous abuses."
221. For example, in 1996 the United States Congress enacted legislation imposing sanc-
tions on Burma (Myanmar) due to its gross human rights violations. See Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009-166, and 3009-167 (1997).
222. Chinkin, supra note 9, at 590.
223. See generally Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 91; Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR,
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that it was a legitimate democratic regime committed to the ideals of
human rights. In Nepal, where there is a conflict between national
laws and binding human rights principles, the latter govern. 225 It is likely
that CRLP knew of the pressure on new governments, such as Nepal's,
to comply with their human rights commitments in order to gain le-
gitimacy and to ensure good diplomatic relations with the Global
North. Thus, adopting the language of human rights in new democra-
cies or in countries seeking legitimacy in the international community
may be particularly effective.
E. Non-Consideration of Underlying Socio-Cultural
or Political Practices
Human rights analysis is theoretically attractive to INGOs because
it allows them to engage in advocacy without necessarily calling into
question the existing socio-cultural or political regime allowing for
rights violations to occur. INGOs demand that the illegal violation of
women's human rights stop, not that the socio-cultural or political re-
gime that allows for such violation be altered. While asking for the
former may implicate the latter, the two demands are different. Asking
that a particular human rights violation stop is discrete; asking a country
to change entrenched patterns of socio-cultural and political engage-
ment is overly broad.
It is likely that demanding that a government stop a particular vio-
lation of women's rights will be more palatable to domestic leaders than
attacks on the whole structure of a society. For one, those in power may
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 59 (1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); Second Op-
tional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the
Abolition of the Death Penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No.
49, Annex at 207, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), (entered into force July 11, 1991); Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant, supra note 92; CEDA W, supra note 92;
Children 's Convention, supra note 91; International Convention for the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1965)
(entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter Convention of Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination]; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, UN GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at
197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) (Jun. 13, 1991). Moreover Nepal has signed docu-
ments negotiated at UN Conferences such as: ICPD Programme ofAction, supra note
91; Beijing Platform for Action, supra note 91.
224. Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Initial Reports Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant:
Nepal, U.N. ECSCOR, at 91 2-3, U.N. Doc. E/1990/5/Add.45 (1999).
225. ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 36.
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see demands to change their socio-cultural or political structure as in-
fringing on national sovereignty or as cultural imperialism. This may
dissuade them from acting to end the rights violation.
Moreover, even if a country recognizes that there must be a shift in
its socio-cultural or political organization, compliance with such a de-
mand may be difficult. How does one quickly change entrenched
patterns of social organization? In this regard, a discrete demand to stop
violating a particular human right allows a state to comply through a
discrete action.22' This may be attractive to some states, especially those
seeking international approval through compliance with international
227obligations. Finally, a government may be more apt to respond to a
demand to remedy a particular rights violation to deflect scrutiny from
overall social structures in society that are oppressive to women22 1 or
where compliance with the demand does not require government ex-
/• 221
penditure.
CRLP's recommendations to the Nepali government in its report,
Abortion in Nepal: Women Imprisoned, are indicative of the strength of
human rights discourse in allowing INGOs to make discrete demands
to stop rights violations. All of the recommendations involve specific
measures that attempt to remedy the rights violations chronicled in the
report.2 0 For example, CRLP urges the government to "adopt the 11th
Amendment Bill decriminalizing abortion in most circumstances,"
"[r] elease women who are currently in prison for having had abortions,"
ccease prosecuting women for having undergone illegal abortion proce-
dures," and "implement and enforce guarantees of the rights of criminal
226. For example, in December 2001, the Kenyan government criminalized female genital
mutilation ("FGM") in response to domestic and international pressure regarding the
protection of children's and women's human rights. However, despite criminaliza-
tion, it is unlikely that FGM will stop since it is an entrenched cultural practice. See
Kenya: It May Be a Crime But FGM Won't End Yet, AFRICA ONLINE (Jan. 28, 2002),
available at http://www.africaonline.com/site/Articles/ 1,3,45116.jsp (last visited Oct.
28, 2003).
227. Id. ("The Kenyan parliament on 29 November passed the Children Bill 2001, the
first comprehensive child law in the country and an attempt to bring national law in
line with the UN Convention on the Rights of the child.").
228. For example, while Kenya took the laudable step of criminalizing FGM, the oppres-
sion of women remains systemic and widespread. See Press Release, Amnesty
International, Kenya: A Human Rights Memorandum to the New Government (Feb.
18, 2003), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAFR320042003
(last visited Oct. 29, 2003).
229. Often, a government will pass a law which they claim will put an end to the rights
violation, without adequately enforcing the law. See id. (suggesting that Kenya must
ensure that its FGM law is enforced).
230. See ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 15-19.
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defendants and prisoners."23' The strength of human rights discourse in
allowing INGOs to frame their requests discretely is apparent from this
example.
1. Failing to Address the Root Cause of Rights Violations
While there are strategic benefits to side-stepping critical analysis of
the underlying social structure of society that has resulted in rights viola-
tions, there are also costs. The results-oriented nature of rights discourse
glosses over the fundamental reason why women's rights continue to be
neglected: the oppression of women under patriarchal forms of social
organization. An INGO that adopts the language of human rights is
limited to demanding that the violation of women's rights be stopped or
that women be granted certain rights.112 If the violation is stopped or
these rights are granted, the INGO cannot ask for more without going
outside the rights paradigm. This is problematic because it does not al-
low INGOs to bring into focus the historic and continued oppression of
women. It does not call into question the system of patriarchy that
causes rights violations or prevents women from actually exercising their
rights. 3 While some may question whether it is even appropriate for
INGOs to question the social structures of a society, it is at least clear
that many of the victories that result from a focus on an end to rights
violations will be only partial victories.234
In Nepal, CRLP demanded that abortion be legalized in order to
stop various rights violations that resulted from its criminalization. After
Nepal complied with this demand, CRLP called it a victory for
231. Id. at 15-16.
232. See SMART, supra note 180, at 144 ("There are several problems with using rights as
part of a feminist strategy. The first is that rights oversimplify complex power rela-
tions. This means that the acquisition of rights in a given area may create the
impression that a power difference has been 'resolved.' Yet the exercise of power in,
for example, the private sphere may have little to do with legal rights.").
233. Id.
234. Id.
[Tihe exercise of a right does not [necessarily] empower the weaker indi-
vidual. It may simply draw the state's attention to a situation ... This is
not, of course, an argument against rights. It is, however, meant to alert us
to the fact that legal rights do not resolve problems. Rather they transpose
the problem into one that is defined as having a legal solution. This may
not be the problem identified by the individuals whose rights are being in-
voked, moreover the solution may itself do little to alter the power relations
that remain intact.
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women.2 15 However, the victory is only partial if women continue to live
under patriarchy. In such a case, despite the existence of safe and legal
abortion, many women will not be able to obtain an abortion due to
pressure from their fathers or husbands and the devaluing of their
autonomy. Additionally, the government may not devote adequate re-
sources to ensuring access to safe abortion services. These factors may
not change even when abortion is safe and legal. The focus on human
rights and the securing of discrete rights draws attention away from this
fact. By failing to question whether the underlying modes of social or-
ganization that allowed the rights violation to occur in the first place
have also changed, human rights discourse has the potential to equate
not violating a right with the empowerment of women within society.
Oftentimes this is not the correct equation. The inability to question
the underlying social structures that lead to rights violations is a short-
coming in human rights analysis, especially when the concern is the
protection of women's interests.
F The Existence of International Human Rights
Organizations and "Rights Talk"
From a practical standpoint, an INGO may adopt the language of
human rights to protect women's interests simply because it is, fore-
most, a human rights organization. Many of the well-established, well-
funded and high profile INGOs advocating for women's interests are
international human rights organizations; examples include Amnesty
International, Human Rights First (formerly the Lawyer's Committee
for Human Rights) and Human Rights Watch. These INGOs were us-
ing the language of human rights in relation to the protection of civil
and political rights long before the women's human rights movement of
the 1990s.236 It makes sense that such organizations would embrace the
women's human rights approach due to their comfort with the language
of human rights and to ensure consistency with their overall mandate.
235. Press Release, Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, Nepal's King Legalizes Abor-
tion: A Victory for Nepalese Women and Advocates Worldwide (Sept. 6, 2002),
available at http://www.crlp.org/pr_02-0926nepal.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2002).
236. For example, Amnesty International was formed in 1961 to advocate for the rights of
political prisoners. See Amnesty International, About Amnesty International, available
at http://web.amnesty.org/pages/aboutai-index-eng (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
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Moreover, such INGOs can implement a "Women's Rights Division, 237
as one part of their overall scheme, or launch a "Women's Day Cam-
paign" without having to apply for separate funding.238
Of course, on its face, this does not explain the existence of many
INGOs that focus exclusively on women's human rights, such as CRLP.
There may still be pressure on international women's organizations to
employ the discourse of human rights because they operate in a com-
munity in which the dominant vocabulary is that of human rights.
Collaboration with and support from other INGOs may be easier to
negotiate when one is using a common language.
V. A ROLE FOR FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY IN RESPONDING TO SOME
OF THE CRITIQUES OF HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE
The idea that "women's rights are human rights" has come to
dominate advocacy by INGOs globally. However, there are some nega-
tive implications associated with the exclusive reliance on human rights
discourse in relation to the protection of women's interests globally.
This section considers how feminist legal theory may offer a discourse
for responding to some of these challenges.
A. Feminist Legal Theory: A Working Definition
Before articulating a working definition of "feminist legal theory,"
its limited relevance must be acknowledged. The definition put forward
will not be universally accepted and will not capture the myriad strands
of feminist legal analysis that have developed in the last twenty years.
The only purpose in posing a definition at all is to aid in the foregoing
discussion. For the purpose of this analysis, feminist legal theory refers
to a discourse in which particular laws and legal institutions are seen as
237. Human Rights Watch has such a division. See Human Rights Watch, Women's
Rights, available at http://www.hrw.org/women/index.html (last visited Nov. 3,
2003).
238. See Amnesty International, Freedom from Terror, Safety From Harm: Challenge your
Government to Stamp Out the Torture and Ill-treatment of Women (March 6,
2001), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ engACT770022001 ?Open
Document&of=THEMES\WOMEN?openDocument&of=THEMES\women (last
visited Nov. 3, 2003).
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reflecting and reinforcing patriarchal norms, thereby contributing to the
continued marginalization of women. 239
This definition presumes an understanding of the feminist notion
of patriarchy. In the starkest terms, patriarchy is systemic male domina-
tion. 2'0 According to feminists, society is structured around power
relationships and, in particular, around the power of men.241 This forms
the basis of patriarchy. The effects of patriarchy are found in both the
private and public sphere, and in both intimate and institutional rela-
tionships. In the private realm, the results of patriarchy include the
privileging of male children in many cultures242 and widespread domes-
tic violence throughout the world . In the public realm, patriarchy
explains the undervaluation of female labor in many societies and the
relative absence of women in politics.245 In terms of the proposed defini-
tion, feminist legal theory views aspects of law, a public institutional
framework, as reflecting and reinforcing patriarchal male power.246
239. See SEX EQUALITY, supra note 194, at 2.
The second-class status of women as a group is widely documented to be
socially and legally institutionalized, cumulatively and systematically shap-
ing access to life chances on the basis of sex. As a result, women, compared
with men, are deprived of access to many measures and markers of social
worth, including dignity, respect, resources, security, authority, credibility,
speech, power, and full citizenship.
240. Association for Women's Rights in Development, Young Women and Leadership
Glossary, available at http://www.awid.org/ywl-glossary/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2003)
Patriarchy is defined as "institutionalized male domination," the "situation of men
being dominant in all state institutions," and "men having more power and more ac-
cess to power than women."
241. Id. See also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
(1989) [hereinafter TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE].
242. ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 30.
243. See Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104,
U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 217, U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (1993). The
Preamble to the Declaration refers to the facts that violence against women is perva-
sive and cuts across lines of income, class and culture.
244. See ABORTION IN NEPAL, supra note 4, at 31.
245. INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT:
BEYOND NUMBERS, Foreword (1997), available at http://www.idea.int/gender/wip/
index.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2003).
Patriarchy, subordination of women, and the deep-rooted perception that
the public domain is reserved for men and that the social contract is about
the relationship between men and government and not citizens and gov-
ernment, come together to exclude women [from politics] notwithstanding
rights guaranteed in law and the political rhetoric of good governance and
participatory democracy.
246. SEX EQUALITY, supra note 194, at 23.
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Certain laws both reflect and reinforce patriarchal norms. A law
may reflect patriarchal norms because it is created in a social context in
which male power is the dominant form of gender ordering. 47 The re-
flection of patriarchy in certain laws is inevitable because there are no
alternative forms of gender ordering that are similarly privileged or as
pervasive in our society. Even though other methods of gender ordering
might be envisioned, law may still reflect male power because it is cre-
ated and interpreted by those who have a vested interest in maintaining
the status quo. For the most part, policy-makers, legislators, regulators,
and judges are men and the law tends to reflect their viewpoints, con-
cerns and aspirations. And while many judges would not see themselves
as actively perpetuating patriarchy, they often do so by simply "applying
the law" without critical analysis.
Because a law may reflect patriarchal norms, upholding it reinforces
these same norms. For example, a law that criminalizes abortion is a
reflection of patriarchy in two ways. First, by penalizing women who
choose to terminate their pregnancy, the law implies that a woman's
role is that of child-bearer.2 8 Second, a law criminalizing abortion
suggests that women are incapable of controlling or should be denied
control over their own bodies. 249 Anti-abortion laws also reinforce
Legal institutions have largely supported or enforced these inequalities,
whether women are expressly stripped of legal rights by law, given formal
equality in countries where legal rules are not the real rules, or given sex
equality where law counts but gender-specific violations of it are ig-
nored.... In a combined regime of unequal treatment and status, through
a seamless web of society and law, women as women-understood as
members of a social group defined as gender female-are deprived of ave-
nues for independence and self-development, degraded for profit and
entertainment and pleasure, violated with impunity, and exploited without
limit. In such regimes, law sees women to limit and control them. Other-
wise, it does not see them at all.
247. TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 241, at 161-62.
The state is male in the feminist sense: the law sees and treats women the
way men see and treat women. The liberal state coercively and authorita-
tively constitutes the social order in the interest of men as a gender-
through its legitimating norms, forms, relation to society, and substantive
policies. The state's formal norms recapitulate the male point of view on
the level of design.
248. Center for Reproductive Rights, Abortion, available at http://www.crlp.org/
ww iss abortion.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2003) ("At the core of reproductive
rights is the principle that a woman has the right to decide whether and when to have
a child. When faced with an unwanted pregnancy, only she can decide whether she
will carry the pregnancy to term.").
249. Id.
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patriarchal notions. Such laws give institutional legitimacy to patriarchal
norms, shape popular perceptions about appropriate gender roles, and
suggest that it is permissible to rob women of their autonomy.250
Feminist legal theory suggests that laws that reflect and reinforce
patriarchy will contribute to the continued marginalization of women.
Marginalization refers to the peripheral status of a group of people in
terms of their power in society. Through the reflection and reinforce-
ment of male power, particular laws increase the already existing power
disparity between the sexes and contribute to the further marginaliza-
tion of women. Due to their marginalization, women's needs and
interests are undervalued. In the end, according to feminist legal theory,
the law can be seen as another tool for male domination of women.
B. Adoption of the Language of Feminist Legal Theory to Respond
to Some of the Critiques of Human Rights Discourse
This subsection considers whether feminist legal theory, as defined,
is a discourse that could be relied upon by INGOs to respond to some
of the critiques of human rights discourse. There are particular instances
where an INGO may wish to couple its reliance on human rights dis-
course with arguments grounded in feminist legal theory.
1. Universalism
Feminist legal theory has been subject to similar attacks as human
rights analysis based on its tendency to universalize the experiences and
goals of differently situated women."' Even still, feminist legal theory
offers a means of responding to some of the critiques of human rights
universalism.
At a macro level, feminist legal theory is subject to the same attacks
as human rights discourse regarding universalism: critics question its ap-
plicability outside the West. Feminist legal theory has its origins in
feminism, which in turn has its origins in the Western concept of indi-
250. Kenneth L. Karst, Women's Constitution, 1984 DuKE L. J. 447, 457 (1984) ("Promi-
nent among the means historically used to control women's sexuality and maternity
has been the law. The range of controls can be called to mind just by reciting a list of
legal topics ... [including] abortion.").
251. Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990)
(criticizing MacKinnon for attempting to speak for women of colour).
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vidual rights.252 People suggest that the link between feminist legal the-
ory and the Western liberal concept of rights makes it inapplicable to
non-Western cultures.2  The critique is similar to the one launched
against human rights discourse in that it suggests that feminist legal the-
ory involves envisioning a universal set of concerns that are applicable to
all women. 24 According to some scholars, internationalizing feminist
legal theory has the potential to be ethnocentric.255
While feminist legal theory can be attacked as universalist, it does
not attract the same particular critiques associated with the universalist
notion of human rights. For example, a major failing of human rights
discourse is that it does not allow for value judgments and privileging in
situations where there is a conflict between two peoples' rights.2 6 In
contrast, feminist legal theory is not bound by the idea that there can be
no privileging of certain people's rights over the rights of others."' It is
inherently connected to value judgments because it is rooted in con-
demnation of patriarchal domination. Thus, a feminist theorist would
not face the same conundrum when determining, for example, whether
a woman should be allowed to have an abortion despite the protests of
the father. A feminist theorist would recognize the historical oppression
of women and the devaluing of their choices, and would privilege the
autonomous decision of the woman.
Moreover, feminist legal theory is not married to the notion of
formal equality to the same extent as human rights analysis. Due to the
focus on universalism, human rights discourse is constrained by the idea
that we are all entitled to the same set of rights and that no person is
entitled to more rights than another. 258 This is problematic in relation to
women because such formal equality reinforces the marginal status of
women. While feminist legal theory does not aim to secure the power
252. See Jean Bethke Elshtain, Exporting Feminist: Transcending National Boundaries, 48 J.
INT'L AFFAIRS 541 (1995).
253. Id. at 544.
254. See L. Amede Obiora, Feminism, Globalization, and Culture: After Beijing, 4 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 355, 395-399 (1997).
255. Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Ethnocentrism and Feminism: Using Contextual Methodology
in International Women's Rights Advocacy and Education, 28 S.U.L. REv. 279, 284
(2001). While Lopez seems to use interchangeably the idea of an international femi-
nist movement and a women's rights movement, her critique is applicable to what
this paper has defined as feminist legal theory.
256. See generally Olsen, supra note 172.
257. See TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 241.
258. Universal Declaration, supra note 91, at art. 2 ("Everyone is entitled to all the rights
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind," thereby
implying that no person is entitled to more rights than any other person.).
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for women over men, it does focus on substantive equality. For example,
a feminist legal theorist would recognize that, because women have his-
torically been marginalized through patriarchal legal institutions, they
must be accorded more extensive legal rights than their male counter-
parts in order to obtain true equality. The feminist legal theorist's focus
on substantive equality is an important means of addressing the prob-
lems emanating from the universalist notion of human rights.
2. Consideration of Underlying Socio-cultural
or Political Practices
Another weakness discussed in relation to INGOs advocacy based
on human rights theory is the tendency not to consider the underlying
social, cultural and political practices that lead to rights violations.259
Ensuring that women's human rights are not violated without critically
analyzing the underlying system that has created the violations that may
result in partial victories. Explicit reliance on feminist legal theory by
INGOs provides a means for thinking critically about the patterns of
social organization that result in rights violations, and a means to avoid
satisfaction with partial victories.
Under the definition offered, feminist legal theory focuses on sys-
tems of patriarchy as reflected and reinforced in law. Explicit reliance on
feminist legal theory would allow INGOs to focus on the underlying
patriarchal systems that lead to the marginalization of women and
thereby suggest solutions that have a potential to actually change the
status of women in society. While the demands made by those who
adopt the language of feminist theory may be discrete, such as legalizing
abortion, the theoretical basis for the demand would call into question
the whole socio-cultural and political foundation of society. While hu-
man rights analysis avoids asking why a rights violation is occurring, this
is the very focus of feminist legal theory.
2 60
Because feminist legal theory questions the underlying patriarchal
norms influencing law, victories based on it will have strong preceden-
tial value. If a government accepts that a law must be changed because it
is a reflection of patriarchal norms, it may be easier to argue that other
laws that are also influenced by patriarchy are also illegal. This can be
contrasted to human rights analysis where, once a specific rights viola-
tion stops, it is difficult to apply the victory to other campaigns in that
259. SMART, supra note 180, at 144.
260. See generally TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 241.
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261country. In this manner, arguments based on feminist legal theory
may be attractive to INGOs that wish to assist in vast reforms to the
justice system in a given country and ensure that women are able to
benefit from the end of overt rights violations.262
The Nepal example is illustrative. CRLP played an extremely im-
portant role in highlighting the fact that denial of safe and legal abortion
violated the legally-enforceable and universally-applicable human rights
of Nepali women.26 ' However, while CRLP mentioned the patriarchal
nature of Nepali society in its report Abortion in Nepal: Women Impris-
oned,264 it did not focus on the way in which the restrictive abortion law
in Nepal reflected and reinforced patriarchal norms. Failure to do so
drew attention away from the fact that, despite the legalization of abor-
tion through reform to the Muluki Ain in March 2002, many women
will be unable to access abortion due to the systems of patriarchy at play
in their communities.
Thus, while CRLP deemed the legalization of abortion a victory,
more explicit consideration of feminist legal theory would have sug-
gested that, while the end to the overt violation of women's rights is
significant, it is insufficient to truly promote the interests of women.
Explicit reliance on feminist legal theory would have allowed CRLP to
highlight the fact that the legalization of abortion is more meaningful if
it is coupled with attempts to undermine patriarchal structures that rob
women of their autonomy.
However, it should be noted that there are circumstances in which
the feminist preoccupation with patriarchy is inadequate to explain the
particular oppression being experienced by women. In her article enti-
tled Rape, Genocide, and Women's Human Rights, Catherine MacKinnon
suggests that systematic rape committed in the context of a genocidal
war cannot adequately be explained by feminism.2 5 While feminists
would acknowledge the atrocities, the discourse would suggest that be-
cause the oppression of women by men is the norm, the rape of women
during war is just "business as usual," albeit more public and grue-
some. Some feminists might even suggest that focusing on rape in
261. However, note that the victory may serve as a helpful precedent in campaigns in
other countries.
262. Note that broad reform to Nepal's justice system was not CRIP's goal since its man-
date is focused on reproductive rights, though it would likely have been supportive of
other initiatives aimed at raising the status of women.
263. See, e.g., ABoRTIoN IN NEPAL, supra note 4.
264. Id. at 30-31.
265. Rape, Genocide, and Women's Human Rights, supra note 126, at 11.
266. Id.
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times of war draws attention away from the rapes that occur in the pri-
vate realm on a more regular basis. However, according to MacKinnon,
"genocide is not business as usual-not even for men.""' Rape commit-
ted as a tactic of genocidal war has roots more complicated than
patriarchy; there is a danger that a feminist legal theorist will overlook
this fact due to his/her exclusive focus on patriarchy. 269 This is a strong
critique against the use of feminist legal theory by INGOs in all in-
stances as a means for addressing the underlying source of rights
violations. In certain situations, INGOs must find alternative means for
understanding the underlying reasons why rights violations occur.
However, where the existence of patriarchal social structures ade-
quately explain the cause of rights violations, it is essential for INGOs
committed to advancing the cause of women to draw attention to those
structures. Failure to do so exposes INGOs to attacks of being short-
sighted and incomplete. While partnerships between INGOs and
domestic groups are essential to understanding the patriarchal nature of
a society, through such exercises INGOs cannot absolve themselves of
the responsibility to highlight the social structures that have caused the
267. Id.
268. Id. at 11-12.
Like all rape, genocidal rape is particular as well as part of the generic, and
its particularity matters. This is ethnic rape as an official policy of war in a
genocidal campaign for political control. That means not only a policy of
the pleasure of male power unleashed, which happens all the time in so-
called peace; not only a policy to defile, torture, humiliate, degrade, and
demoralize the other side, which happens all the time in war; and not only
a policy of men posturing to gain advantage and ground over other men. It
is specifically rape under orders. This is not rape out of control. It is rape
under control. It is also rape unto death, rape as massacre, rape to kill and
to make the victims wish they were dead. It is rape as an instrument of
forced exile, rape to make you leave your home and never want to go back.
It is rape to be seen and heard and watched and told to others: rape as spec-
tacle. It is rape to drive a wedge through a community, to shatter a society,
to destroy a people. It is rape as genocide.
269. Id. at 11.
The feminist version of the cover-up is particularly useful to the perpetra-
tors because it seems to acknowledge the atrocities-which are hard to
deny (although they do that too)-and appears to occupy the ground on
which women have effectively aroused outrage against them. But its func-
tion is to exonerate the rapists and to deflect intervention. If all men do
this all the time, especially in war, how can one pick a side in this one? And
since all men do this all the time, war or no war, why do anything special
about this now? This war becomes just a form of business as usual. But
genocide is not business as usual-not even for men.
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rights violations in question. This is especially the case because INGOs
tend to get more funding and media attention than domestic groups. In
relation to Nepal, CRLP saw its role as complementing domestic advo-
cacy focused mainly on feminist legal analysis of the old Muluki Ain by
bringing a human/reproductive rights perspective to the issue.27° While
the goal is laudable, it could have also highlighted the patterns of patri-
archy that resulted in the criminalization of abortion. In short, INGOs
need not abandon the language of human rights in advocating for
women's interests, but must couple their advocacy with explicit reliance
on feminist legal theory to highlight the patriarchal societal structures
that have allowed rights abuses to occur, and work towards dismantling
such structures.
3. The Existence of Binding Legal Obligations
For the most part, human rights discourse is particularly attractive
to INGOs because it is based on enforceable legal obligations entered
into voluntarily by the state in question. However, by focusing on le-
gally enforceable obligations, INGOs are forced to work within the
international legal system as it is constituted. In this regard, INGOs that
rely exclusively on human rights discourse must pitch their advocacy in
terms of the violation of discrete rights, and must also accept the historic
privileging of civil and political rights over economic, social and cultural
rights.
INGOs may wish to adopt the language of feminist legal theory in
situations where there are no violations of discrete rights per se. In cer-
tain instances, women may face various injustices that cannot be
characterized as a particular rights violation. Such injustices might in-
clude the feminization of poverty, or the increasing number of women
suffering from AIDS. INGOs may also wish to employ feminist legal
theoretical insights where there tend not to be flagrant human rights
abuses related to women. In such instances, it may be more effective for
INGOs to focus on the way in which the social and cultural patterns of
male domination are reflected and reinforced through the law.
Moreover, INGOs should consider using the language of feminist
legal theory because it is capable, in a way that human rights discourse
historically has not been, of privileging certain interests over others. The
privileging of civil and political rights in human rights theory has a
270. Interview with Upreti, supra note 35.
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disproportionately negative impact on women.2 Feminist legal theory,
as defined, does not require the same sort of naming and categorization
of interests; it is focused on the way in which law reflects and reinforces
patriarchal norms to the detriment of women. It aims at raising
women's overall status in society.272 Feminist legal theorists would only
distinguish between the types of interests at issue to the extent that each
interest has a disproportionate impact on the status of women; in this
regard, it may "privilege" the economic, social and cultural rights that
affect women most. In terms of advocacy, since the majority of the
rights violations relating to women are of an economic, social and
cultural nature, it may be in the interests of INGOs to adopt the
language of feminist legal theory.
4. The Relative Strength of Human Rights Obligations versus
Constitutional Protections
Human rights discourse is poised to be incredibly effective in coun-
tries where human rights obligations are respected, where the
government wishes to integrate more fully into the international com-
munity, and where appeals to human rights obligations are more
effective than domestic constitutional protection. It will be less effective
in countries where international human rights law is not well respected,
where binding human rights instruments have not been signed and rati-
fied, where constitutional protections are stronger than international
safeguards on women's rights, or where domestic sovereignty concerns
are paramount. Countries that have historically resisted application, ei-
ther explicitly or implicitly, of international human rights instruments
domestically include the United States273 and Singapore.274 In such in-
stances, it will likely be more effective for an INGO to employ feminist
legal theory to lobby the government.
271. Day, supra note 202, at 2.
272. SEx EQUALITY, supra note 194, at 24.
When law guarantees equality on the basis of sex, it assumes that women
and men are equal in some relevant sense. To defend current social reality
as consistent with a guarantee of equality of the sexes is to assert that
women's current treatment is equal. This, in turn, is to defend systemati-
cally fewer material resources and systemic victimization through
aggression as what equality for women looks like-a notion that can be
valid only if women are a different order of being from men.
273. See Henkin, supra note 217.
274. See Tay, supra note 214.
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VI. CONCLUSION: CRITICALLY ANALYZING THE
HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM ITSELF
This paper is a first attempt at critically analyzing the modern trend
of INGOs to adopt the language of human rights to advocate for
women's interests. Perhaps INGOs should consider explicit reliance on
feminist legal theory to respond to some of the shortcomings associated
with exclusive use of human rights analysis.
A byproduct of this analysis is the conclusion that INGOs must
commit themselves to critical analysis of the discursive techniques they
employ to secure the interests of women. The language of feminist legal
theory may be an effective means for INGOs to critically analyze the
human rights framework itself. In this light, the framework must be
viewed as a legal construct that itself reflects and reinforces patriarchal
norms. Adoption of the idea that "women's rights are human rights"
does not and should not deter INGOs from considering the manner in
which human rights discourse can sometimes detract from the pursuit of
or obscure the nature of women's interests. The dangers of using human
rights discourse only manifest themselves when one stops being critical
of the discourse and becomes afraid to abandon or supplement it when
required by the interests of women. Unthinking and unwavering alle-
giance to the idea that "women rights are human rights" cannot be
tolerated when such allegiance does not result in the best outcome for
women.
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